The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense of No Privacy in Public by Anderson, Heidi Reamer
The Mythical Right to Obscurity:
A Pragmatic Defense of No Privacy in Publict
HEIDI REAMER ANDERSON*
Abstract: In several states, citizens who videotaped police
misconduct and distributed the videos via the Internet
recently were arrested for violating state wiretapping
statutes. These arrests highlight a clash between two key
interests-the public's desire to hold the officers accountable
via exposure and the officers' desire to keep the information
private. The arrests also raise an oft-debated privacy law
question: When should something done or said in public
nevertheless be legally protected as private?
For decades, the answer has been: "[TJhere can be no
privacy in that which is already public." However, given
recent technological developments (e.g., cell phone cameras
and YouTube), some scholars suggest that the law
sometimes should restrict the exposure of truthful
information shared in public. Like the police who claim to
need privacy to do their job, these scholars claim that
people need privacy in public in order to feel dignified and
to feel comfortable developing new ideas. In their
pragmatic balance, these privacy-related needs appear to
trump exposure-related benefits.
In this Article, I argue that certain assumptions have led
these scholars to overstate privacy-related harms and to
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understate exposure-related benefits. After documenting
and critiquing those assumptions, I show how the proper
balance likely favors exposure over privacy in all but a few
special cases. Ultimately, I conclude that the law should
continue to protect the mass exposure of truthful yet
embarrassing information via the "no privacy in public"
rule. Otherwise, we risk sacrificing the many benefits of
exposure-including those resulting from exposure of police
misconduct-on the altar of a mythical right to obscurity.
I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to privacy and accountability, people always demand
the former for themselves and the latter for everyone else.'
On June 14, 2010, police officer Ian Walsh attempted to detain
two teenaged criminal suspects at a busy intersection in Seattle,
Washington.2 While he was struggling with the first suspect, a second
suspect pushed Officer Walsh's arms away from the first.3
Immediately, Officer Walsh swung and punched the second suspect
directly in the face.4 The suspects were arrested and later released.5
1 DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 1 (1998) (commenting on the proliferation of video
surveillance). Justice Scalia once shared a similar sentiment regarding the conflict between
people's desires for privacy and accountability, stating: "This law has every appearance of a
prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon the press but not upon itself." Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring). In Florida Star, the Court
held that a state law forbidding the reporting of a rape victim's name by mass media but
not by individuals was unconstitutionally under-inclusive. 491 U.S. at 540. Also
commenting upon the conflict between privacy and accountability, privacy scholar Daniel
Solove has acknowledged that "[p]rivacy impedes discourse, impairs autonomy in
communication, and prevents accountability for one's conduct." Daniel J. Solove, The
Virtues of Knowing Less, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 973 (2003).
2 Seattle Officer Punches Girl in Face During Jaywalking Stop, SEATrLE POST-




4See Levi Pulkkinen & Casey McNerthney, Police Punch Caught on Video Prompts Seattle
Police Review ofArrest Procedures, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (June 15, 2010, 10:00
PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Punch-caught-on-video-prompts-Seattle-
police-889276.php (noting that "[w]hen another woman grabbed him, [the officer]




Had this confrontation occurred on June 14, 1980, instead of June
14, 2010, few people other than those present at the time would have
learned about it or discussed it afterwards. If either teenager later
shared their account with others, listeners may have doubted its
veracity or have been skeptical about the events that occurred. In all
likelihood, the confrontation would have become a story shared
among few, and perhaps forgotten, but that is not what happened with
this story. Instead, because the confrontation occurred in 2010, it was
videotaped by a bystander who then posted the video online via
YouTube. Anyone with an Internet connection then could find the
video via a simple search engine query (e.g., "Seattle police punch"),
and watch it repeatedly, on demand.6
The easily-retrieved Seattle video clip inspired many viewers to
share their opinions online by writing comments to online news
stories, by sharing opinions on blogs, by posting Facebook updates, or
by Tweeting.7 These conversations about the incident addressed
several important public policy issues, including: (i) racial tension
(Officer Walsh was white, the suspects were African-American), (ii)
sex discrimination (Officer Walsh was male, the suspects were
female), and (iii) the government's police power versus the liberty of
its citizens (the punch was viewed by many as excessive given the
suspects' relatively minor offense of jaywalking).8 Similarly rigorous
policy debates have occurred in multiple cities throughout the United
5 See Pulkkinen & McNerthney, supra note 4 (documenting suspects' release).
6 Id. (reporting that video was recorded by a "bystander"). As of January 5, 2011, the
"official" video posted on YouTube had over 1.7 million views. See Seattle Police
Confrontation - komonews.com, YOUTUBE (June 14, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E9w9AfptGGQ&feature=player-embedded.
7 The inner workings and appeals of these social networking sites have been well
documented elsewhere. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOwA L. REV.
1137,1142-49 (2009) (describing architecture of, and most common uses of, Facebook and
MySpace); Paul M. Schwartz, Review: From Victorian Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76
U. CHI. L. REV. 1407, 1447 (2009) (describing Twitter as "a microblogging service that
allows its users to send and read other users' messages... known as tweets, which are
messages of no more than 140 characters in length.").
8 Pulkkinen & McNerthney, supra note 4 (reporting parties' gender and race and noting
that the President of Seattle's Urban League "call[ed] the violent altercation an
overreaction to jaywalking"); Casey McNerthney, Police Guild: Officer Did Nothing Wrong
in Videotaped Punch, SEAT'LE POST-INTELLIGENCER (June 14, 2010),
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Police-guild-Officer-did-nothing-wrong-in-
885514.php (reporting police union president's opinion that Officer Walsh "did nothing
wrong" and showing 234 written comments from June 15, 2010 to June 21, 2010).
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States in recent years, all triggered by violent police behavior exposed
via "citizen journalism."9
With each police exposure video, the public and government
response generally proceeds in one of two directions. Some
government officials react with a look inward, via internal
investigations and, ultimately, changed policies. 1° Others react by
pointing the finger outward-at the one doing the videotaping. For
example, in at least five states, citizens who videotaped police
misconduct were prosecuted for violating eavesdropping and
wiretapping laws, which bar recording conversations, absent consent
of all parties, except when there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy." In one notable example, a motorcyclist posted a video of his
own roadside encounter with a plain-clothed, gun-wielding police
officer who cited him for speeding.12 Shortly after the video received a
9 Only three months earlier, a different Seattle policeman was videotaped stomping on the
head and body of a wrongly-apprehended Hispanic suspect while exclaiming, "I'm going to
beat the [expletive] Mexican piss out of you, homey. You feel me?" FBI Investigating
Seattle Police Beating, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (May 9, 2010, 10:00 PM),
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/FBI-investigating-Seattle-police-beating-
89o125.php. Perhaps the most infamous police brutality exposure in recent memory was
the video depicting Bay Area Rapid Transit police Officer Johannes Mehserle shooting
unarmed passenger Oscar Grant in the back. See John Cote, Police Kill Man Near Station
Fruitvale BARTStation, S.F. CHRON., July 18, 201o at C1, available at
http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-07-18/bay-area/21988301 1 bart-police-bart-officers-
fruitvale-bart-station (recalling how "Grant was killed as he lay face down on the platform"
and how "the shooting touched off widespread protests in Oakland... after a Los Angeles
jury convicted Mehserle of involuntary manslaughter.., instead of a more serious murder
charge"). A quick Google search for "police beating video" sadly reveals hundreds of such
incidents in 2010. See Injustice Everywhere: The National Police Misconduct Statistics
and Reporting Project, http://www.injusticeeverywhere.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2011)
(maintaining "national police misconduct newsfeed" with summaries and links).
10 For example, Seattle issued "Seattle Police Office of Professional Accountability" reports
and "launched a global review of arrest tactics" after the Officer Walsh video surfaced.
Police Guild, supra note 8.
n See Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of Prosecutions for Videotaping the Police,
ABCNEWS.COM (July 19, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-
arrest/story?id=11179076 (documenting arrests in Maryland, Florida, and New
Hampshire); Wendy McElroy, Are Cameras the New Guns?, GIZMODO (June 2, 2010, 5:00
PM), http://gizmodo.com/5553765/are-cameras-the-new-guns (documenting arrests in
Illinois and Massachusetts and opining that "the prosecutions are a form of social control
to discourage criticism of the police or simple dissent").
12 See Sanchez, supra note 11; McElroy, supra note 11 (describing circumstances
surrounding Anthony Graber's arrest). A Maryland Circuit Court judge later dismissed the
charges against Mr. Graber. See Peter Hermann, Judge Says Man Within Rights to Record
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great number of views on YouTube, six state troopers showed up at
the motorcyclist's home with a warrant, seized his computer, and later
charged him with violating Maryland's anti-wiretapping statute; if
convicted, he could face up to sixteen years in prison. 13
Arrests like these (i.e., arrests of those "caught" videotaping
police), consequently have triggered their own privacy-themed debate.
Because the threat of criminal prosecution for taping police acts as a
censor, some commentators have called for states to more clearly
permit such recordings and facilitate the public interest benefits they
trigger. 14 In opposition, police officers and their supporters argue that
the threat of constant surveillance and later distribution via the
Internet is an unfair invasion of privacy that prevents them from
adequately doing their job. For example, officers may hesitate to take
necessary action out of concern that a partial and possibly inaccurate
video recording of that action will lead to the officers' firing or to bad
police work. This concern, in turn, threatens the officers' reputation
and public safety as a whole.5
Police Traffic Stop, BALT. SUN, September 27, 2010, at Ai. Judge Plitt's opinion read, in
part: "Those of us who are public officials and are entrusted with the power of the state are
ultimately accountable to the public.... When we exercise that power in a public forum,
we should not expect our activity to be shielded from public scrutiny." Id.
13 See MD. CODE ANN. § 10-402 (2000); Sanchez, supra note 11; McElroy, supra note 11
(describing circumstances surrounding Anthony Graber's arrest).
14 See Opinion, Our View on Cops and Cameras: When Citizens Film Police, It Shouldn't
Be a Crime, USA TODAY, July 15, 201o, at Aio; Sanchez, supra note 11 (quoting David
Rocah, an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, as stating, "The
message is clearly, 'Don't criticize the police' .... With these charges, anyone who would
even think to record the police is now justifiably in fear that they will also be criminally
charged."); David Rittgers, Editorial, Maryland Wiretapping Law Needs an Update, BALT.
SUN, June 1, 2010, at A13 (suggesting changes to Maryland law because threat of criminal
prosecution is "enough to make citizens pause before pushing the record button"); H.R.
Con. Res. 298, 11ith Cong. (2010).
15 See Dennis J. Slocumb and Rich Roberts, Opinion, Opposing View On Cops and
Cameras: Respect Officers'Rights, USA TODAY, Opinion, July 15, 201o, at loA (opposing
videotaping of officers in part because of "the inability of those with no understanding of
police work to clearly and objectively interpret what they see"). In retort to this argument,
one journalist responded: "If they're doing good police work, they should not be worried
about getting caught on tape." Rittgers, supra note 14; cf. Daniel J. Solove, "I've Got
Nothing to Hide" and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745
(2007) (critiquing "nothing to hide" arguments like that of Rittgers). At least two police
departments have decided to address the concern of incomplete footage by wearing
cameras themselves. See BART Tests Police Cameras, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 30, 2011,
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2O11/sep/3o/bart-tests-police-cameras (detailing
plan of San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit police to wear cameras); Lisa Halverstadt,
Arizona Officers Wearing Video Cameras, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Apr. 9, 2011,
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In many ways, the current debate over citizen exposures of public
police conduct mirrors a broader exposure versus privacy debate
among legal scholars: When should something done "in public"
nevertheless be "private" and, thus, legally protected from exposure? 16
Surprisingly, the combination of technologies that helped the Seattle
police incident ignite such a useful debate-recording (small video
camera), distribution (Internet/YouTube), and indexing (Google)-is
the same combination that has led some privacy scholars to call for
restricting the exposure and flow of truthful information shared in
public. 17 Their thesis is supported, in part, via anecdotal stories about
persons exposed and the harm such persons suffered. 18 Like the police
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2o11/o4/o9/2O1104O9 police-camera-
recordings.html (describing how police forces in Arizona will wear cameras in addition to
using dashboard cameras).
16 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 1, at 969 (framing the question as, "When is it justifiable for
the law to prohibit the disclosure of another person's private information?"); see generally
Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978) (using economic theory
to justify only a few circumstances in which one should be able to restrict the flow of
accurate, personal information about one's self).
17 See Neil M. Richards and Daniel J. Solove, Prosser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1889 (2010) ("Today, the chorus of opinion is that the tort law of
privacy has been ineffective, particularly in remedying the burgeoning collection, use and
dissemination of personal information in the Information Age."); M. Ryan Calo, People
Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST.
L. REV. 809, 817-824 (2010) (collecting other scholars' technology-based arguments for
privacy regulation and concluding that "the notion that technology implicates privacy
insofar as it augments the power to collect, process, or disseminate information dominates
privacy and technology commentary"); Jacqueline D. Lipton, "We the Paparazzi:"
Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 919, 927 (2010)
(suggesting that "[t]he fact that individuals can instantly snap a photograph.., and can
then disseminate that image instantaneously and globally at the push of a button, raises
significant problems"); Solove, supra note 1, at 970 (justifying the regulation of personal
disclosures "[g]iven the development of technologies that permit extensive data gathering
and dissemination"); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 101 (2009) [hereinafter,
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY] ("New technologies have spawned a panoply of
different privacy problems").
18 See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text; Lipton, supra note 17, at 921-22
(chronicling stories of Star Wars Kid and Dog Poop Girl as evidence of "worrying new
trend" of "intruding into each other's privacy and anonymity with video and multimedia
files in ways that harm the subjects of these digital files"); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE
OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 38-48 (2007)
[hereinafter, SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION] (documenting the "sobering consequences"
of the online exposures of individuals known as Dooce, the Numa Numa dancer, Little
Fatty, and Star Wars Kid). Implicit in some of these stories is a fear directive-that you,




who claim to need privacy to protect their reputations and do their job
effectively, these scholars argue that people often need protection
from exposure of what they do or say in public in order to feel wholly
dignified and to feel comfortable developing new ideas. 19
Although these scholars' primary goals-protection of individual
dignity and individual "thinking space"-may be admirable, their
attempts at balancing the costs and benefits of their proposed
protections appear misplaced in at least two ways. First, they tend to
overstate the potential privacy-related harms that result from
exposure of information initially shared in public.2° Second, they
frequently understate the many existing and potential benefits of
exposing truthful information shared in public.21 After correcting for
these errors, the revised pragmatic balance shared below indicates
that the benefits of exposing public conduct likely outweigh the
harms, even without directly invoking First Amendment speech
rights.22 Accordingly, this Article concludes that the law should not
restrict the collection and reporting of truthful information shared in
public in order to prevent a perceived, potential harm to someone's
privacy interests.23
Part I of this Article briefly defines the conflict between exposure
and privacy.24 It also documents how the law previously has resolved
that conflict through the "no privacy in public" rule.25 Part II reviews
the position of other scholars that the "no privacy in public" rule is an
19 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 1o8 (noting how "persistent
gawking can create feelings of anxiety and discomfort" that harm one's dignity); Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a
Right to Stop People from Speaking about You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1110-12 (2000)
(chronicling other scholars' arguments for privacy restrictions on the basis that the
disclosure "injures people's dignity or emotionally distresses them"); Neil M. Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 412-16 (2008) (arguing that spatial privacy is
necessary for thought development).
20 See infra notes 173-214 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 217-267 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Part III.C. Although some of the exposure-related harms and benefits I identify
involve speech elements, and thus, the First Amendment interests of the speaker, one need
not constitutionalize my arguments in order to make them persuasive.
23 See infra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 44-89.
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inadequate and antiquated rule that fails to protect obscurity.26 In
Part III, this Article shows how these scholars' demand for a right to
obscurity is misplaced because they (i) overstate the potential harms
linked to more technologically-advanced and democratized exposure,
and (ii) inadequately account for the many benefits of exposure that
would be blocked should their quest for a right to obscurity succeed.27
Finally, in Part IV, this Article tentatively concludes that the benefits
of the "no privacy in public" rule likely outweigh the privacy harms.28
Ultimately, changing the "no privacy in public" rule would risk
sacrificing the many benefits of exposure-including those resulting
from the exposure of police misconduct-on the altar of a mythical
right to obscurity.29
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN EXPOSURE AND OBSCURITY
In this Part, I discuss the terminology and historical background
necessary to appreciate the current debate over technology's alleged
assault on obscurity. In Part I.A, I briefly define the terms exposure
and privacy and characterize certain conflicts between the two as the
"Obscurity Problem." Next, in Part I.B, I show how the law generally
has resolved the Obscurity Problem through the simple "no privacy in
public" rule. In later Parts, I demonstrate how this rule remains
proper today, despite most pro-obscurity scholars' assertions to the
contrary.30
A. DEFINING THE OBSCURITY PROBLEM
Generally, exposure occurs when one, without the express consent
of the other: (i) lawfully gathers truthful information about another
person or entity shared by the exposed person in public, and (ii)
makes that information available to someone other than himself, often
26 See infra notes 89-13o and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 131-267 and accompanying text.
28 Note, however, that there are special cases for which this balancing tips the other way.
See infra Part III.D.
29 See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (equating calls for privacy in public to calls
for a right to obscurity).
30 See infra notes 111-138 and accompanying text.
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in a context other than the one in which the information was shared.31
Exposure encompasses a broad range of actions, including an in-
person recount to another of an event one witnessed earlier, a blog
post about a speech recently given, and the surreptitious video
recording of someone in public, later published to a website. As these
few examples demonstrate, exposure can be helpful, neutral, or
perhaps hurtful to the one exposed.32 If enough people pay attention
to it and remember it, one effect of an exposure on the exposed person
is to reduce his obscurity.33 Prior to the exposure, his words or actions
were known only to a few; after the exposure, they are known to
many.34 Ultimately, it is most helpful to view obscurity as the absence
of exposure.
Viewing obscurity as the absence of exposure helps to better frame
the current debate over the validity of the "no privacy in public" rule
as a binary conflict of interests.35 On one side, the side of exposure, are
the benefits that flow immediately and in the long run from the
general sharing of public information about people with each other;
on the other side, the side of obscurity, are the harms prevented by
31 For those familiar with Daniel J. Solove's privacy taxonomy, this definition incorporates,
in part, the allegedly "harmful activities" of "information collection," "information
processing," and "information dissemination." SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra
note 17, at 103.
32 For example, the person exposed may view the in person recount as neutral gossip, the
blog post about the speech as helpful publicity, and the surreptitious video recording as
harmful to his dignity.
33 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2008) ("Personal information that was once
obscure can be revealed almost instantaneously via a Google search."); see also SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 149 (quoting Aesop for the proposition that
"[o]bscurity often brings safety").
34 See SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 7 ("People who act
inappropriately might not be able to escape into obscurity anymore; instead, they may be
captured in pixels and plastered across the Internet.").
35 Focusing on the exposure versus privacy conflict also narrows the applicability of this
Article's arguments to only those issues involving private citizens' exposure of public
conduct, thus excluding those privacy issues involving other core interests. This category
may be viewed as a subset of the "informational privacy" category. See Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2010 (2010) (agreeing that
"information privacy is a category with enough commonalities to render it a coherent
concept") (citations omitted).
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protecting the same and similar information from exposure.36 Setting
up the analysis in this "harms versus benefits" fashion also permits us
to do the situational, problem-based harm analysis that at least one
pro-pragmatism scholar, Daniel Solove, suggests is appropriate.37
In his book Understanding Privacy, Solove argues that the proper
approach to addressing privacy concerns is to consider the interests
involved in individual privacy problems.38 In this article, I accept
Professor Solove's invitation to begin balancing harms and benefits in
particular "problem situations" involving privacy.39 Specifically, I
consider the harms and benefits of what I call the Obscurity
Problem.40 The Obscurity Problem occurs when a private actor (whom
I and others describe as a "citizen journalist"41) lawfully collects and
further exposes information (spoken or behavioral) that someone else
initially shared in public.42 Because any legal response to the
36 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis described the natural conflict as follows: "Matters
which men of the first class may justly contend, concern themselves alone, may in those of
the second be the subject of legitimate interest to their fellow citizens." See Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 215 (1890).
37 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 174; see also Danielle Keats
Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Review: Visionary Pragmatism and the Value of Privacy
in the Twenty-First Century, io8 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (2010) (reviewing and endorsing
Solove's approach).
38 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 174.
39 Id.
40 This problem would encompass, at least in part, the sub-problems Solove identifies as
Identification, Disclosure, Accessibility and Distortion. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY,
supra note 17, at 121-26 (identification), 140-46 (disclosure), 149-50 (increased
accessibility), 158-61(distortion).
41 See Randall D. Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter's Privilege, 57 AM. U.L. REV.
1341, 1366-67 (2008) (discussing "the rise of so-called citizen journalists" who "post
information of public concern" via blogs, social networking sites and cable news sites). As
Eliason further notes, CNN calls reports from citizen journalists "I-Reports" while Fox
News calls similar reports "U-Reports." Id. at 1367 n.97; see also Jonathan Krim, Subway
Fracas Escalates Into Test of the Internet's Power to Shame, WASH. POST, July 7, 2005, at
Doi, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/200s/o7/o6/AR200so7o6o1953_pf.html (describing the Internet as
"a venue of so-called citizen journalism, in which swarms of surfers mobilize to gather
information on what the traditional media isn't covering, or is covering in a way that
dissatisfies some people").
42 By definition, the Obscurity Problem excludes other related yet distinct privacy
"problems," such as government surveillance or stalking, and only applies when the
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Obscurity Problem would involve changing the "no privacy in public"
rule, the next section briefly chronicles the evolution of this rule as a
way to resolve the Obscurity Problem.43
B. THE "No PRIVACY IN PUBLIC" RULE
The "no privacy in public" rule is tantalizing in its simplicity.
Generally stated, it is: "[T]here can be no privacy in that which is
already public."44 The practical effect of the rule is that one has no tort
law-protectable privacy interest (including a right to obscurity) in
what one does or says in public.45 This section begins with a brief
overview of how this rule emerged in the late 19th century and how it
developed through the mid-2oth century in both tort and criminal
procedure contexts.46 The overview illustrates how the rule's concept
of "in public" was used initially as an adjective describing the nature of
the person or information exposed, and later as an adjective
describing the person's physical location.47 Later sections of the
exposed person is the one who initially shared the information. For a discussion of how
such problems are different from the Obscurity Problem, see Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy
of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
43 See infra notes 44-88 and accompanying text. Part III shows how balancing harms and
benefits supports retention of the "'no privacy in public" rule.
44 Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953). In Gill, the plaintiffs sued after
Harper's Bazaar and related magazines published a photo of them in an "affectionate
pose" at the Los Angeles Farmers' Market. Id. at 442. The court rejected plaintiffs' invasion
of privacy claim because the photographed and published kiss took place "not ... on
private grounds but rather.., in a public market place." Id. at 444. By "voluntarily
expos[ing] themselves to public gaze in a pose open to the view of' others, the plaintiffs
"waived their right of privacy." Id.
45 See Patricia Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARv. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 6 (2007) ("[Clourts have generally held that anything capable of being viewed
from a 'public place' does not fall within the privacy torts' protective umbrella."). As with
any rule, there are exceptions in certain contexts, especially those involving property. For
example, dropping one's unpublished manuscript in public does not mean that anyone can
pick it up and print it without paying royalties any more than one could take one's house
keys dropped in public and claim the house as one's own. Such extreme examples involve
appropriation, in the former instance, and criminal breaking and entering, in the second,
both of which fall outside the scope of this Article.
46 See infra notes 61-88 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 54-6o and accompanying text; see also Abril, supra note 45, at 2 (using
examples of gossip regarding drunken behavior to illustrate that "privacy is usually a
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Article will detail others' critiques of, and my defense of, the "no
privacy in public" rule as it applies to the Obscurity Problem.48
1. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE IN THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Privacy first was identified as a common law right in Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis's Harvard Law Review article, The Right
to Privacy.49 Warren and Brandeis defined the right in various ways,
including as the "right to be let alone"5o and as the "right of
determining . to what extent [one's] thoughts . . shall be
communicated to others."5' Their widely reported, yet later
questioned, motivation for writing the piece was a disdain for
exposures that occurred after Warren's marriage to a New York
socialite, and his associated loss in obscurity.52 Ultimately, Warren
and Brandeis called for a limited freedom from exposure of certain
actions and information shared in public in order "to protect the
privacy of private life."53
function of the physical space in which the purportedly private activity occurred, its subject
matter, whether it was veiled in secrecy, and whether others were present").
48 See infra Parts II and III.
49 Although the term "right to privacy" permeates legal and popular writings, many
scholars have challenged the concept of privacy as a "right." See generally Diane L.
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy
Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291 (1983); see generally Volokh, supra note 19. Unlike this
article, however, these critiques focus on the First Amendment as the primary justification
for limiting privacy.
50 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 195 (citing COOLEY ON TORTS, 2d ed., at 29).
51 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 198 (further suggesting that one "generally retains
the power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given [his thoughts]"); Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 36, at 198 n.2 ("It is certain every man has a right to keep his own
sentiments, if he pleases. He has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them
public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends.") (quoting Yates, J.).
52 See Richards & Solove, supra note 17, at 1897 n.59 ("Prosser believed that the press
coverage surrounding the wedding of Warren's daughter had inspired the [Right to
Privacy] article, although subsequent scholarship has proven that this could not actually
have been the case.") (citations omitted).
53 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 215.
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Most relevant to the instant Article, Warren and Brandeis also
attempted to define the types of information to which one's right to
privacy did not extend, using a three-pronged public-versus-private
distinction based on analogies to the common law of libel and slander,
as well as French law.54 First, they stated that "[t]he right to privacy
does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or
general interest."55 This exclusionary statement used the word
"public" as an adjective describing the nature of the information
involved, regardless of the physical space in which the information
was shared.56 Next, Warren and Brandeis used "public" to describe the
kind of individual involved, versus the nature of the information or its
physical origin; inferring that the professional aspirations of the man
himself determine whether the information about him is public or
private. Specifically, they opined that information about one who
seeks public office or position is "public," while the same kind of
information about a person who seeks no such office or position
would be "private."57 Combining these first two prongs of Warren and
54d. at 214-15.
55 Id. at 214. Elsewhere in The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis asserted that "the
law must.., protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate
concern" and "all persons, whatsoever their position or station" from having information
"made public against their will." Id. at 214-15 (emphasis added).
56 Solove, supra note 1, at 1OOl (describing Warren and Brandeis's public versus private
distinction as a "newsworthiness test" based on whether a matter "is of public or general
interest").
57 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 215 ("To publish of a modest and retiring
individual that he suffers from an impediment in his speech or that he cannot spell
correctly, is an unwarranted, if not an unexampled, infringement of his rights, while to
state and comment on the same characteristics found in a would-be congressman could not
be regarded as beyond the pale of propriety."); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 215
("Since, then, the propriety of publishing the very same facts may depend wholly upon the
person concerning whom they are published, no fixed formula can be used to prohibit
obnoxious publications."). This type of distinction appears to mirror the public figure
versus private figure distinction in defamation law that lives on despite having been
chipped away at via various rulings suggesting that whomever or whatever is worthy of
press attention automatically loses private figure status. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that public figure plaintiff must show that
defamatory statement was made with "actual malice"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (distinguishing "all purpose" public figures, such as a current mayor,
from "limited" purpose public figures, such as a crime victim); Solove, supra note 1, at
ioo8-1o (chronicling and critiquing the "public versus private figure" distinction);
Christopher Russell Smith, Dragged into the Vortex: Reclaiming Private Plaintiffs'
Interests in Limited Purpose Public Figure Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1419, 1421 (2004)
(suggesting that, under lower courts' recent applications of the public figure doctrine, "a
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Brandeis's private versus public distinction (the nature of the
information and the aspirations of the person), one gets the following
summation of the "no privacy in public" rule: "[T]he matters of which
the publication should be repressed may be described as those which
concern the private life, habits, acts and relations of an individual, and
have no legitimate connection with his fitness for a public office which
he seeks or for which he is suggested ...and have no legitimate
relation to or bearing upon any act done by him in a public or quasi-
public capacity."58
Third, Warren and Brandeis briefly defined private versus public
in the spatial sense, but only through a metaphor and without actual
mention of the word "public." Specifically, they declared: "The
common law has always recognized a man's house as his castle,
impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution
of its commands. Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to
constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient
curiosity?"59 By referring to a "man's house as his castle," Warren and
Brandeis appear to draw a line between what a man does within his
own home and what he does outside of that particular zone of
privacy.60 Interestingly, Warren and Brandeis did not mention this
spatial sense of private versus public until the last few lines of their
article, and, unlike the other two prongs of public versus private, they
mentioned it without citation to any source. Thus, Warren and
Brandeis acknowledged the value in exposure of certain information
shared in public, yet they yearned for additional legal protection for
private plaintiff may be found to be a public figure even though he or she has little or no
involvement in [a] controversy").
58 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 216.
59 Id. at 220.
60 The concept of a man's home as his castle-and, thus, a place worthy of protection from
intrusion by the government and private individuals-often is referred to as the Castle
Doctrine. The Castle Doctrine has been used in various contexts, including cases involving
Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues, homicide cases involving self-defense, and
privacy cases. Many trace the origin of the Castle Doctrine to English Common Law, and,
more specifically, to Sir Edward Coke in Semayne's Case. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-
Defense?, 2 J.L. ECON. POL'Y 187, 199 (2006). In Semayne's Case, Lord Coke stated, "For a
man's house is his castle, & domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium; for where shall a
man be safe, if it be not in his house?" See David I. Caplan & Sue Wimmershoff-Caplan,
Postmodernism and the Model Penal Code v. the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and the Castle Privacy Doctrine in the Twenty-First Century, 73 UMKC L.
REV. 1073, 1090 (2005) (citations omitted).
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some information and actions shared in public. 6 1 For them, the
"public" part of the "no privacy in public" distinction referred to the
person, to the nature of the information about the person, and to the
person's physical location when the information was shared.
2. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE IN PROSSER'S PRIVACY TORTS
6 2
In the many decisions and voluminous commentary to follow
Warren and Brandeis's article, no person was more influential than
William Prosser, primarily through his treatise, Handbook on the Law
of Torts, and his 1960 California Law Review article, Privacy.63 In
these and other works, Prosser shaped a disorganized set of privacy-
related cases into four tort-based causes of action one could use to
protect the right to privacy defined by Warren and Brandeis. 64 The
four torts included: (i) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion, (ii)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, (iii) false light
publicity, and (iv) appropriation. 65 The Restatement of Torts, with
Prosser as its chief reporter, adopted this four-pronged approach to
6, At least one scholar has suggested that, at its core, Warren and Brandeis's binary
distinction between the public and the private was a distinction between conduct or spaces
associated with men, which were considered public, and those more traditionally
associated with women, which made up the private sphere. See Neil M. Richards, The
Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1304-05 (2010).
62 Athough this article focuses on the four privacy torts originally crafted by William
Prosser, other torts also involve privacy interests. See Solove, supra note 1, at 971-73
(noting torts such as breach of confidentiality for disclosures by physicians and banks as
well as statutory restrictions on the disclosure of certain records).
63 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1st ed. 1941) [hereinafter
PROSSER, HANDBOOK]; William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960)
[hereinafter Prosser, Privacy]; see also Richards & Solove, supra note 17, at 1888
(anointing Prosser as "privacy law's chief architect"); see also Richards & Solove, supra
note 17, at 1903-12 (chronicling history of Prosser's "influence over the development of
tort privacy").
64 See Richards & Solove, supra note 17, at 1888 (noting that Prosser "was engaged with
tort privacy throughout his career, from his earliest torts scholarship in the 1940s until his
death in 1972"). In the sixty years preceding his article, privacy as a tort theory had
struggled to develop, being limited at first to commercial uses of persons' likenesses
without permission and a handful of state statutes purporting to protect additional uses as
well. See Richards & Solove, supra note 17, at 1893-95 (citations omitted).
65 Prosser, Privacy, supra note 63, at 389. Prosser's efforts have been characterized as
"tak[ing] a mess of hundreds of conflicting cases and reduc[ing] them to a scheme of four
related but distinct tort actions." Richards & Solove, supra note 17, at 1889.
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privacy; courts and legislatures implemented it as well.66 All of these
sources of law reflect, to some degree, Prosser's own skepticism about
the coherence, wisdom and utility of the privacy torts. 67 This
skepticism, in turn, stunted the torts' growth and prevented them
from evolving to clearly cover more modern privacy concerns. 68
Prosser's primary concern about the reach of these torts was that
they provided "a power of censorship over what the public may be
permitted to read, extending very much beyond that which they have
always had under the law of defamation." 69 In particular, he was
concerned about the privacy torts' potential to restrict the press.70
Given this concern over restricting the public's access to truthful
information, Prosser "sought to limit [his privacy torts'] capacity for
growth" and succeeded.71 One specific tactic he used to purposefully
stunt the growth of his own creations was to emphasize the "no
privacy in public" distinction in the torts' elements and their
suggested applications.
Prosser's use of the public versus private dichotomy at first
appears to model that of Warren and Brandeis's first and second
prongs discussed above. In his handbook, Prosser states that none of
the privacy torts restricts or punishes the publication of information
"of public interest of a legitimate character."72 This statement, like that
of Warren and Brandeis, uses the word public to describe the nature
of the information and perhaps the identity of the person-and not the
66 Richards & Solove, supra note 17, at 1904.
67 Id. at 1906-07.
68Id.
69 See id. at 19oo (quoting Prosser, Privacy, supra note 63, at 423).
70 See id. at 1897-98 (citing Prosser, Privacy, supra note 63, at 410).
71 See id. at 1905-07. G. Edward White concisely summarized the Prosser-led progression
as follows: "A classification made seemingly for convenience (1941) had been expanded and
refined (1955), hardened and solidified (196o and 1964, when the 'common features' of
privacy were declared), and finally made synonymous with 'law' (1971). Prosser's capacity
for synthesis had become a capacity to create doctrine. One began an analysis of tort
privacy by stating that it consisted of 'a complex of four wrongs,' and implicitly, only those
wrongs." See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 176
(expanded ed. 2003) (quoted in Richards & Solove, supra note 17, at 1905).




physical space in which the information is shared.73 However, Prosser,
in a possible deviation from Warren and Brandeis, effectively
neutralizes other privacy torts by repeatedly using "public" in the
spatial sense. This is most pronounced in the publicity to private facts
tort, which suggests no liability "when the defendant merely gives
further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already
public" or for "what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public
eye."74 Similarly, in the intrusion upon seclusion tort, an invasion of
one's personal physical area, or its equivalent, is required.75 Implicit in
this element is that there must be some legitimately secluded space in
which the other party is intruding-a private, versus public, space.
Under the Restatement, one only has an intrusion claim if the
intrusion occurs in the home or other traditionally secluded place,
such as a hotel room.76 The spatial part of the private versus public
distinction also is evident in the voluminous cases interpreting the
intrusion and other privacy torts which both preceded and followed
Prosser's Privacy.7 Ultimately, Prosser's version of the public versus
73 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (documenting Warren and Brandeis's
approaches to the public versus private distinction).
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
75 See id. at § 652B (1977); see also Stien v. Marriott Ownership Reports, Inc., 944 P.2d 374
(Utah Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting invasion of privacy claim based on video footage of
employees later shown at company party).
76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977) (suggesting that invasion
may be by physical intrusion into hotel room or home or other examination such as of
one's mail, wallet, or bank account); id. at cmt. c ("Nor is there liability for observing him
or even taking his photograph while he is walking on the public highway."); id. at illus. 6-7
(distinguishing drunken behavior on public street from having one's skirt blown over her
head to reveal underwear).
77 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 164 (2008) ("U.S. courts
recognize intrusion-upon-seclusion tort actions only when a person is at home or in a
secluded place. This approach is akin to courts recognizing a harm in surveillance only
when it is conducted in private, not in public."); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying,
Spying and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73
TUi. L. REV. 173, 204 (1998) ("Intrusion is designed to protect an individual's sphere of
privacy, whether spatial or psychological .... "). Prosser's influence on case law is well-
documented; thus, the many privacy tort cases need not be further re-examined here.
Rather, it is sufficient to note that the private versus public distinction also is evident in the
cases interpreting Prosser's torts. See Richards & Solove, supra note 17, at 19o6 ("Based on
our familiarity with several hundred privacy tort cases from the 196os to the present, the
overwhelming majority of courts have adopted wholesale the specific language of either the
Restatement or Prosser's other works in defining the privacy torts."); SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 161-62, 164 (reviewing cases).
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private distinction's effect on the privacy torts, as reflected in the
Restatement, is as follows: "There is no liability when the defendant
merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff which
is already public."78
3. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE IN FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES
Perhaps the clearest and most familiar application of the public
versus private distinction in the spatial sense is in criminal search and
seizure cases.79 In its simplest form, the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule blocks the use of evidence obtained during a
warrantless search of an area in which the defendant had both a
subjective expectation of, and an objectively reasonable expectation
of, privacy.8° In determining whether one's expectation of privacy is
objectively reasonable, the Supreme Court has said that "in the home,
our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area
is held safe from prying government eyes.""1 Thus, one focus of the
reasonableness inquiry is on the location in which the search was
conducted and, more specifically, its proximity to the defendant's
78 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c. (1977). However, as acknowledged
in Part III.D, exposures of certain aspects of a person, even if captured in public, likely
involve a different balance of interests and thus are less worthy of protection. See infra
notes 272-78 and accompanying text; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. c
(1977) ("Even in a public place, however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff,
such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may
still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.").
79 This emphasis on spatial privacy in search and seizure cases is understandable given that
the text of the Fourth Amendment uses the word "houses." U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ").
80 See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In order to be protected from a warrantless search
under the exclusionary rule, one must pass Katz's two-part test: (i) the person must "[first]
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and (ii) "second.... the
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring). The practical effect of the Katz decision was to require the
government to obtain a warrant before wiretapping a phone and recording the content of
conversations.
81 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001); see also United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294, 300 (1987) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house and that
the extent of the curtilage is determined by... whether the area harbors the "intimate




hom e. 82 Even a search of one's home by electronic means may be
deemed to invade someone's reasonable expectation of privacy in a
physical space.83 Ultimately, if the government conducts a warrantless
search of a person's private space-most often, his home-then the
evidence obtained in that search cannot be used because the person
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in such space. 84
As the search location moves away from the inside of one's home,
the objective reasonableness of the privacy expectation becomes more
remote. 85 For example, the Supreme Court has endorsed warrantless
searches of one's property from an aircraft in public air space and of
one's garbage bags placed at the curb. 86 This is because as the search
moves away from a person's home, it becomes more likely that the
person has voluntarily consented to having the information made
available to others.87
82 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (198o) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn
a firm line at the entrance to the house."). Although it is true that the Katz majority
declared that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," Katz, 389 U.S. at 351,
"what protection it affords to those people ... generally.., requires reference to a 'place."'
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In other words, whether one's expectation of privacy is
deemed "reasonable" often depends in large part upon where one was located at the time
and how much that place was like one's home. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 334-35. For a recent
and thorough critique of the Supreme Court's focus on the home and one's proximity
thereto in determining the scope of one's Fourth Amendment rights, see Stephanie M.
Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 905 (2010).
83 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35 (finding that authorities' warrantless use of heat-
sensing technology not in general public use to obtain information about the inside of
defendant's home invaded his reasonable expectation of privacy).
84 However, even items within one's home or office are not necessarily protected if one
exposes them to the public. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (quoting
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
85 The four factors to be used to determine whether a space falls within a home's
"curtilage," and thus is entitled to heightened Fourth Amendment protection, are: "(1) the
proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the area is within an enclosure surrounding
the home; (3) the nature and uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the
resident to protect the area from observation by passersby." Dunn, 480 U.S. at 1139
(finding that barn was not part of home's curtilage in part because it was not used for
intimate activities).
86 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (police examination of partially-open
greenhouse from aircraft in navigable airspace was not a search that violated defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 36-37 (1988).
87 See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39 (reasoning that defendants had no expectation of privacy
in their garbage bags placed at the curb in part because such bags "left on or at the side of a
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The Supreme Court also has stated that no one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in something done in "plain view" or in an
"open field." 88 Similarly, under the third party doctrine, sharing
information with a third party defeats later claims to privacy in that
information.89 For example, one has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in an email after it is delivered to its intended recipient.9o Nor
does one have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers one
dials by phone, given that those numbers were shared with someone
else-the phone company. 91 Thus, if the conduct or information was
shared in a public or quasi-public place or even with someone else in a
private place, then it most likely could be collected and used against a
defendant because he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
something shared in public. Together, these limitations on one's
reasonable expectation of privacy in the warrantless search context
public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other
members of the public."). Most recently, the Supreme Court considered whether it should
carve out an exception to the "no privacy in public" rule for warrantless constant
monitoring of a suspect's vehicle via use of a GPS tracking device attached by the
government. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Although the space invaded
was the suspect's car versus his home, the Court concluded that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment because it involved a trespass-like intrusion of a constitutionally-
protected area. Id. at 950. The Court's decision in Jones likely supports my thesis because
the Court's analysis focuses on the spatial location of the search and that location's
proximity to a traditionally-private space. Id. at 941 ("Where, as here, the Government
obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, such a
search has undoubtedly occurred.").
88 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42 (citations omitted) ("[I]t is ... well settled that searches and
seizures of property in plain view are presumptively reasonable."); Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) ("[The] special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to
the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' is not extended to the open fields.
The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law." (citing
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)).
89 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) ("[A] person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties."); see generally Orin S. Kerr, Defending the Third Party Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1229 (2009) (summarizing and defending doctrine); see also SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 139-40 (critiquing third party doctrine).
90 See Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268, 1281-82 (1ith Cir. 2010) ("A person also loses a
reasonable expectation of privacy in emails, at least after the email is sent to and received
by a third party.") (citations omitted).
91 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (concluding that the use of "pen registers" to collect the
numbers dialed by phone did not require a warrant because the person using the phone
'voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company").
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have led some scholars to equate privacy under the Fourth
Amendment with "total secrecy."92
III. CALLS FOR A RIGHT TO OBSCURITY EXCEPTION TO THE "No
PRIVACY IN PUBLIC" RULE
Synthesizing the "no privacy in public" rule from all of the above
summarized sources, Daniel Solove insightfully stated as follows:
"[A]ccording to the prevailing view of the law, if you're in public,
you're exposing what you're doing to others, and it can't be private."93
This prospect of constant potential for exposure has led Solove and
others to critique the "no privacy in public" rule as a "binary
understanding of privacy" that is both antiquated and inadequate.94
The rule purportedly is antiquated because of recent technological
developments regarding the collection, distribution, and indexing of
information that threaten obscurity in ways not anticipated when the
rule first emerged.95 Next, the rule is inadequate, practically speaking,
92 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1087, 1107 (2002) ("In
a variety of legal contexts... [p]rivacy is thus viewed as coextensive with the total secrecy
of information."); William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1o6, 1021-22 (1995) (reviewing search and seizure cases and
concluding that "the [key] question ... is whether what the police did was likely to capture
something secret" and suggesting that "privacy-as-secrecy dominates the case law"); see
also Julie E. Cohen, Surveillance: Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 181, 190 (2008) (documenting how "the U.S. legal system purports to
recognize an interest in spatial privacy").
93 See SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 163; SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 110.
94 See SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 7 ("Under existing notions,
privacy is often thought of in a binary way-something is either private or public.
According to the general rule, if something occurs in a public place, it is not private.");
Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0's Promise with Robust Privacy
Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 827 (2010) ("A public/private binary also may not
accord with our lived experiences-individuals routinely carve out zones of privacy in so-
called public spaces."); Lipton, supra note 17, at 929-41 (chronicling alleged gaps in
current law that fail to protect one's public conduct from capture by handheld cameras and
later distribution); SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 163 (concluding that
the secrecy versus privacy paradigm in the law "has limited the recognition of privacy
violations"); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 111.
95 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 92, at 191-92 (critiquing emphasis on public visibility when
defining privacy invasions given current surveillance infrastructures); Kevin Werback,
Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321 (2007) (chronicling perceived threat to
privacy in public caused by rising ubiquity and usage of camera phones and other
"pervasive sensors"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis's Right to Privacy, 45
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because it bars people from preventing or recovering for perceived
obscurity harms caused by more tech-savvy exposure.96 These
arguments are summarized in Part III.A, "Technology's Alleged Threat
to Obscurity."
Given technology's threat to obscurity, scholars have suggested
that a new, more nuanced rule is necessary-one that would recognize
claims of privacy in public.97 In crafting the proper rule, Daniel Solove
suggests that lawmakers conduct a pragmatic balancing of harms and
benefits that is better equipped to consider technological
developments and their associated privacy harms.98 Others implicitly
have endorsed this approach.99 Part III.B more carefully describes this
suggested balancing test replacement. Part III then critiques these
Part II arguments as an unnecessary call to protect the mythical right
to obscurity. 1°°
BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 656 (2007) (calling for the Supreme Court to recognize a privacy
interest in the reporting of truthful information because "[t]echnology that Warren and
Brandeis never could have imagined ... presents unprecedented risks to informational
privacy"); Abril, supra note 45, at 5 ("New technologies have enabled novel social
situations that generate privacy harms and concerns that were unforeseeable."); see
generally Andrew Lavoie, Note, The Online Zoom Lens: Why Internet Street-Level
Mapping Technologies Demand Reconsideration of the Modern-Day Tort Notion of
'Public Privacy', 43 GA. L. REv. 575 (2009).
96 See e.g., SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION supra note 18, at 166 ("[M]erely assessing
whether information is exposed in public or to others can no longer be adequate to
determining whether we should protect it as private"); Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism:
The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039,
1041 (2009) (demonstrating how "growing anxiety about the loss of personal privacy in
contemporary society has given new weight to claims of injury from unwanted public
exposure") (citing ANITA ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 6 (2007)); Cohen, supra note
92, at 191 (concluding that "prevailing legal understandings of spatial privacy" are
inadequate because they do not recognize the spatially harmful alteration of "the spaces
and places of everyday life").
97 SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 7, 161 (suggesting a need for "a more
nuanced view of privacy"); Chemerinsky, supra note 95, at 656 (suggesting that it is "time
to rediscover Warren and Brandeis's right to privacy" because of "unprecedented risks to
informational privacy"); Abril, supra note 45, at 4-6 (criticizing courts' "reliance on
physical space" as one of the "linchpins" in privacy because "physical space ... no longer is
relevant in analyzing many modern online privacy harms"); Lipton, supra note 17.
98 See infra notes 118-3o and accompanying text.
99 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 17, at 943 (summarizing Solove's harm balancing approach
and concluding that it "may be the right approach-at least for the present time").
1oo See infra notes 172-269 and accompanying text.
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A. TECHNOLOGY'S ALLEGED THREAT TO OBSCURITY
In The Future of Reputation, Daniel Solove declares that "modern
technology poses a severe challenge to the traditional binary
understanding of privacy." 1°1  For Solove and like-minded
commentators, the "no privacy in public" rule simply is inadequate in
today's tech-savvy information marketplace. o2 Most concerning, is the
three-sided sinister combination of collection, distribution, and
indexing technologies.o3 In the Obscurity Problem scenario, we
supposedly are wielding these technologies against ourselves and our
fellow citizens.V4 If we do not do something about the Obscurity
101 SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 163.
102 Id. at 166 (opining that because of technological advances, "merely assessing whether
information is exposed in public or to others can no longer be adequate to determining
whether we should protect it as private"); Lipton, supra note 17, at 930-33 (arguing that
current tort laws are inadequate to protect personal privacy interest in conduct shared in
public given new technologies such as Facebook, MySpace, YouTube and Flickr); Julie E.
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373, 1379 (2000) (arguing that private means both "not public" and "not common-
owned"); Werback, supra note 95, at 2324-29 (noting threats from various new camera
types); see also SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 4-5 (collecting late
2oth century scholars' statements regarding technology's alleged threat to privacy).
103 SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 17 ("Often, technology is involved in
various privacy problems because it facilitates the gathering, processing and dissemination
of information."); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1607, 1621-41 (1999) (describing supposed "privacy horror show" in cyberspace that
..result[s] from the generation, storage and transmission of personal data"); Jacqueline D.
Lipton, Digital Multi-Media and the Limits of Privacy Law, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
551, 552 (2010) (stating that "the ability of new digital devices such as cell phone cameras
to transmit information wirelessly and globally raises important new challenges for privacy
laws"); Cohen, supra note 102, at 1374 (suggesting new informational privacy concerns
given "rise of a networked society" that facilitates the rapid search, distribution and
connection of one's personal information).
104 SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 164 (describing how "[a]rmed with
cell phone cameras, everyday people can snap up images, becoming amateur paparazzi");
Lipton, supra note 17 (collecting privacy concerns associated with private citizens'
reporting of public conduct by fellow citizens); Marcy Peek, The Observer and the
Observed: Re-imagining Privacy Dichotomies in Information Privacy Law, 8 Nw. J. TECH
& INTELL. PROP. 51, (2009) (describing how the fact that "we are all watching each other"
alters the privacy analy sis). While Solove and Lipton use the term "paparazzi" to describe
citizens who use technology to collect and report on their fellow citizens, I prefer the less
pejorative term, "citizen journalists." See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. As
discussed in Part III, I suggest that before we vilify ourselves further, we need to more
thoroughly consider the benefits of paparazzi- or citizen-led exposure in the aggregate. See
infra notes 215-67 and accompanying text.
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Problem, "[w]e're heading toward a world where an extensive trail of
information fragments about us will be forever preserved on the
Internet, displayed instantly in a Google search."o5 In this doomsday
scenario, "[w]e will be forced to live with a detailed record beginning
with childhood that will stay with us for life wherever we go,
searchable and accessible from anywhere in the world."106 In other
words, the concern is for the person's sudden and perhaps permanent
loss of obscurity.
Victims of the antiquated "no privacy in public" rule are those that
shared information or conduct in public with a small group of
individuals, only to have that information exposed and exploited by
technology. ° 7 People who have had their obscurity taken away from
them via mass Internet-distribution of things they did or said in public
include:
* Dog Poop Girl, who refused to clean up her pet
dog's excrement on a subway train in South
Korea;108
* Numa Numa Guy, who lip-synched and waved
his arms in front of his webcam to the tune of a
Moldovan pop song;10 9
105 SoLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 17 ; see also Peek, supra note 104, at
56-57 (describing how "the aggregation of 'observing' technology enables the private and
public sector to create a near perfect picture of the full spectrum of a person's day and a
person's life").
1o6 SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 7 (differentiating online exposures
because they involve "taking an event that occurred in one context and significantly
altering its nature-by making it permanent and widespread"); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE
DIGITAL PERSON 1-7 (2004) (discussing threat of "digital dossiers"); Lipton, supra note 17,
at 927 (suggesting that new privacy concerns are triggered now that the Internet "makes
the dissemination of video... practically instantaneous and potentially global in scope").
107 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 96 (suggesting that "[d]isclosing
people's secrets.., often affects a few unfortunate individuals" whose "lives are ruined for
very little corresponding change in social norms").
108 SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 1-4; Lipton, supra note 17, at 921.
lo9 SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 42. Numa Numa Guy, also known as
Gary Brolsma, later went on to make more videos, which he posted online; one featured
"Star Wars Kid" in a cameo appearance.
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Star Wars Kid, who performed a series of "Jedi"
physical maneuvers, wielding a golf-ball
retrieving stick as lightsaber-like weapon; 110
Laura K., a college student who propositioned
and paid a part-time blogger/actor to write a
paper for her regarding Hinduism;,
Jonas Blank, a law firm summer associate
whose profanity-laced email came across as a
mockery of his employers and work;112
" Robert, whose sexual exploits and difficulties
were blogged about by his partner, Jessica
Cutler, also known as "Washingtonienne;""13
* Geoffrey Peck, whose attempt to cut his wrists
was captured by a surveillance camera; 114
1ioId. at 44-8. The original less-than-two-minute video of Star Wars Kid was posted to the
Internet by a high-school acquaintance of its star without the Kid's express consent. Thus,
there is some question regarding whether his performance was done "in public," and, as a
result, falls outside the scope of the "no privacy in public" rule. Someone else later edited
the video to include Star Wars music and visual effects, which increased the original video's
popularity.
"'Id. at 76-78; Scott Jaschik, Busted for a Bogus Paper, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 31, 2005,
4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2oo5/o3/31/plagiarize.
112 See SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 29-30 (citing Ben McGrath,
Oops, THE NEW YORKER, June 30, 2003).
13 SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 134-35; West, Story of Us, infra note
257, at 597-600.
14 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 195. Initially, an English court
found no privacy violation in this case "because the plaintiffs 'actions were already in the
public domain,' and revealing the footage 'simply distributed a public event to a wider
public."' SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 195. However, the European
Court of Human Rights instead disagreed, concluding that there was a privacy violation
because the person was not a public figure, while emphasizing "the [systemic] recording of
the data" and the "permanent nature of the record." Peck v. United
Kingdom, HUDOC (April 4, 2003), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highligh
t=peck&sessionid=88oo9156&skin=hudoc-en.
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* Todd, whose allegedly bad dating behavior was
shared on the "don't date him girl" website;"15
* Michael, who wrote about his time in juvenile
detention without considering that such
information would be available to later
acquaintances via a Google search of his
name. 116
The emerging consensus appears to be that the above-listed people
were victimized via exposure that went beyond what they expected at
the time that they shared the information with at least one other
person. 117 Concern over this widespread exposure has led some
scholars to call for legal protections for "information that has been
shared to a few others, but is still not generally known." 18 The concern
is not about the person's privacy, necessarily, because the information
was shared with others, sometimes in a public place. Rather, the
concern is for the exposed person's loss of obscurity.119 Ultimately, the
115 See SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 121.
n
6 See Solove, supra note 1, at 1055.
17 See SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 170 ("Privacy can be violated not
just by revealing previously concealed secrets, but by increasing the accessibility to
information already available."); Chemerinsky, supra note 95, at 656 (suggesting
additional privacy protections are needed given the that "the Internet makes [personal
information] potentially available to many"); Lipton, supra note 17, at 927 (arguing that
current exposures are more harmful because the coupling of cameras and the Internet
"makes the dissemination of video ... practically instantaneous and potentially global in
scope").
18 Richards, supra note 61, at 51 (criticizing Warren and Brandeis's division between
public and private as "the dominant question in privacy law"); see also Cohen, supra note
102, at 1379 (suggesting that some information may no longer be a secret but still worthy of
privacy protection because it is not commonly known).
"19 See SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 7 ("People who act
inappropriately might not be able to escape into obscurity anymore; instead, they may be
captured in pixels and plastered across the Internet."); Citron, supra note 94, at 835




"no privacy in public" rule is labeled obsolete because it does not
protect a person's perceived right to obscurity.120
B. SUGGESTED PRAGMATIC BALANCING TO PROTECT OBSCURITY
To protect obscurity, some suggest that "[t]he law should begin to
recognize some degree of privacy in public. "121 Defining exactly when
the law should do so has proven difficult;122 however, one recently-
crafted approach appears promising. In his latest book,
Understanding Privacy, Daniel Solove constructs a "new
understanding" of privacy, in which he urges us to "understand
privacy as a set of protections against a plurality of distinct but related
problems. '"123 The problem-based approach is an offshoot of the more
general theory of pragmatism, which other scholars explicitly and
implicitly endorse.124
120 Wide circulation of information also was part of what motivated Warren and Brandeis's
call for a right to privacy. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 196 ("Even gossip
apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil.").
121 see SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 168; Lipton, supra note 17, at
930-33 (suggesting that current tort laws are insufficient to protect privacy from picture-
taking and other technological advances); Cohen, supra note 92, at 181 (arguing that
person's privacy interest "is not negated by the fact that people in public spaces expect to
be visible to others present in those spaces").
122 See SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 168 (describing "The
Difficulties of Recognizing Privacy in Public"); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 214
("To determine in advance of experience the exact line at which the dignity and
convenience of the individual must yield to the demands of the public welfare or of private
justice would be a difficult task ... ").
123 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 171.
124 See, e.g., Strahilevitz, Reunifying, supra note 35, at 2032 (including whether "the
gravity of the harm to the plaintiffs privacy interest [is] outweighed by a paramount public
policy interest" as a third element in his proposed privacy tort); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 46-47 (acknowledging pro-pragmatism scholars such as
William James, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Richard Rorty, Richard Posner, and
Cornell West). Although legal scholars generally do not agree as to the proper definition of,
or application of, pragmatism and the law, see Michael Sullivan & Daniel Solove, Can
Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687
(2003) (critiquing Richard Posner's use of pragmatism), for the purposes of this article,
pragmatism essentially means analyzing privacy "in specific contextual situations" versus
universal absolutisms. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 47.
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Under Solove's proposed approach, the first step is to identify
whether a potential privacy problem exists.125 After identifying the
problem, the next step is to analyze the different types of harms
created by the privacy problem."126 When tabulating the harms, we are
to consider them in the aggregate versus with respect to only a single
person, i.e., we are to calculate the "value of privacy.., in terms of its
contribution to society" as well as to the individual exposed.127 After
identifying the privacy problem and valuing the harm caused, we are
to "assess . . . the value of any conflicting interests. '"12 8 Finally, we
perform a balancing to "determine which prevails."29 If the harms to
privacy are greater than the value13° of the conflicting interests, the
law should protect them at the expense of those interests.31 On the
other hand, if the conflicting interests are greater, then they should
win at the expense of privacy, and no reform is necessary.132 The latter
is the position of this Article, with respect to citizen journalists'
125 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 189 (suggesting that a problem
arises when, aided by technology, people, businesses, and governments engage in
"activities that disrupt other activities that we value and thus create a problem").
126 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 174-79 (noting that categories of
harm include physical injuries, financial losses, and property harms, reputational harms,
emotional and psychological harms, relationship harms, vulnerability harms, chilling
effects, and power imbalances).
127d. at 173-74 ("[W]hen privacy protects the individual, it does so because it is in society's
best interest. Individual liberties should be justified in terms of their social contribution.").
128 Id. at 183.
129 Id.
130 Id. at lo ("The value of privacy in a particular context depends upon the social
importance of the activities that it facilitates.").
131 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 183; id. at 185 (acknowledging that
value assigned to harms will vary across cultures, even among supposedly similar groups-
Americans and Europeans.); id. at 179 (noting that in those cases, public policy then should
"effectively redress the harms caused by the problems" via "individual enforcement
mechanisms"); id. at 181 (further suggesting that the law should permit recovery of "true
liquidated damages without requiring proof of any specific individual harm").
132 See, e.g. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 48 ("Few would contend
that when a crime victim tells the police about the perpetrator, it violates the criminal's
privacy."). See also SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 189 ("The way to
address privacy problems is to reconcile conflicts between activities.").
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exposure of statements or actions shared in public, i.e., the Obscurity
Problem.133
IV. HOW THE BENEFITS OF EXPOSURE OUTWEIGH OBSCURITY HARMS
This Part applies the above-described pragmatic balancing test to
the Obscurity Problem.134 The Obscurity Problem category
encompasses situations such as Dog Poop Girl and Robert, listed in
Part II.A, and Officer Walsh, as shared in the Introduction.135
Presently, many scholars contend that affording some "privacy in
public" to these and similar individuals is desirable in order to
eliminate, or at least minimize the Obscurity Problem. 136 Essentially,
they appear to argue that sometimes society's interest in keeping
truthful information within an individual's own sole control is greater
than the public's interest in knowing, possessing and using that same
truthful information, even if the information initially was shared in
public.
To test these scholars' hypothesis regarding the Obscurity
Problem, the pragmatic balancing approach described in Part II.B
requires us to catalog the societal harms triggered by the Obscurity
Problem and then compare those harms to the positive benefits of the
associated exposure. 37 Toward this end, Part III.A documents the
alleged privacy-related harms of the Obscurity Problem, and shows
133 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 121-26; see also supra notes
41-42 and accompanying text (defining the "Obscurity Problem").
134 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 121-26; see also supra notes
41-42 and accompanying text (defining the "Obscurity Problem").
135 See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text; see also, SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION,
supra note 18, at lO6-1o; see also Peek, supra note 104, at 56-57; see SOLOVE, FUTURE OF
REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 44-48.
136 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 92, at 11o9-16 (collecting scholarship regarding privacy as
"control over personal information" and acknowledging that some information falls outside
the scope of "what society deems appropriate to protect"); Lipton, supra note 17, at 930-
33; Cohen, supra note 92, at 181.
137 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 187 ("Protecting privacy requires
careful balancing because neither privacy nor its countervailing interests are absolute
values."); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 84 ("As I have sought to
define it, privacy involves protection against a plurality of kinds of problems. Articulating
the value of privacy consists of describing the benefits of protecting against these
problems.").
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how they may have been overstated.138 Part III.B then documents the
benefits of exposure in this type of situation, and shows how they have
likely been overlooked or undervalued.139 In Part III.C, I suggest that
overstating the harms and understating the benefits of the Obscurity
Problem has resulted in an unnecessary call for changing the "no
privacy in public" rule in all cases other than those special cases
discussed in Part III.D.140 I later conclude that, in the clash between
citizen exposure of public conduct versus obscurity, exposure should
win.141
A. HARMS FROM THE OBSCURITY PROBLEM
Each privacy problem involves a combination of harms.142 The
Obscurity Problem reportedly triggers two key harms. First, the
Obscurity Problem harms the exposed person's emotional and
psychological well-being.143 I call this the "dignity" harm.144 For
example, when Dog Poop Girl found out that her picture and criticism
of her conduct were posted all over the Internet, she felt undignified
and attacked. 145 Robert, whose sexual preferences and proclivities
were shared in a blog post, experienced similar kinds of emotional
138 See infra notes 139-215 and accompanying text.
139 See infra notes 216-67 and accompanying text. As noted below, one scholar who has
begun demonstrating the many societal benefits of more truthful information being
available about everyone is Lior Jacob Strahilevitz. See generally Strahilevitz, Reputation
Nation, supra note 33; but see Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation, supra note 33, at 1677
("More information is not always better. Nor is it always worse.").
140 See infra notes 268-78 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
142 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 173 (showing that privacy's
value "varies across different contexts depending upon which form of privacy is involved
and what range of activities are imperiled by a particular problem").
143 See Id. at 175-76.
144 Solove also discusses the reputational harm; however, defamation law generally
recognizes a reputational harm only from false or misleading information. The Obscurity
Problem, in contrast, only involves exposure of truthful statements or actions.
145 The harm to dignity also may lead to secondary harms of changed choices and paths in
life, such as when Dog Poop Girl quit her job. Lipton, supra note 17, at 921 (citing
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND HOW TO STOP IT 211 (2008)).
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harm.146 Second, an Obscurity Problem, or even just the threat of one,
allegedly harms one's relationship security, 147 which in turn leads to
speech-related chilling effects.4 8 I call this the "thinking space" harm.
For example, knowing that one's thoughts may be recorded and later
exposed to the world-like what happened to now-Justice Sotomayor's
"wise Latina" speech-may discourage people from speaking their
minds and prevent the promotion of good ideas.149 In sum, the
Obscurity Problem is perceived as harmful because it harms one's
personal emotions and chills one's intellectual discourse, both of
which threaten society as a whole.15o Each of these two categories of
harm is discussed below in more detail.
1. HARM TO DIGNITY
As detailed above, scholars have argued that two particular aspects
of the Obscurity Problem tend to cause harm to one's psyche-the
sharing of information with many more people than originally
anticipated and the ease of access to that information over a long
period of time. 15' The target of the exposure is subjected to "unwanted
146 See supra note 11o and accompanying text.
147 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 176-77.
148 Id. at 178. There "may be a widespread chilling effect when people are generally aware of
the possibility of surveillance but are never sure if they are watched at any particular
moment." Id. at lo9.
149 See Charlie Savage, A Judge's View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2009, at A21 (describing video recording of speech by then-Judge Sotomayor in which she
stated her "hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would
more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life"
and documenting the associated uproar upon release of the video following her nomination
to the Supreme Court).
150 Interestingly, these harms appear to dovetail with the harms that most concerned
Warren and Brandeis, i.e., specific harm to the "feelings and personalities of individuals"
and general harms to "the level of public discourse in the press" and a "lowering of social
standards and morality." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36 at 196; see also Richards,
supra note 61, at 1302-03.
151 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 145-46 ("The harm of disclosure is
not so much the elimination of secrecy as it is the spreading of information beyond
expected boundaries. People often disclose information to a limited circle of friends, and
they expect the information to stay within this group."); Cohen, supra note 102, at 1379
(suggesting difference between publicly known and commonly known information);
Chemerinsky, supra note 95, at 656 (arguing that Internet exposure is different due to
larger audience); Lipton, supra note 17, at 927 (arguing that current exposures are more
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notoriety"152 which "can result in embarrassment, humiliation, stigma
and reputational harm."153 These feelings generally could be
characterized as a loss of dignity.54
The mere possibility of subsequent over-distribution also
purportedly affects one's emotions, causing "feelings of anxiety and
discomfort." 155 Similarly, the possibility of information collection,
even if not actually conducted, leads to a perceived loss of solitude.5 6
The fear that a person's personal zone of public space may be intruded
upon, "makes her feel uncomfortable and uneasy."157 Perhaps some of
these anxious feelings are due to the purportedly permanent nature of
the information on the Internet.5 8 This potential for reputation-
harmful because of publication that is "global in scope"). Sometimes this "increased
accessibility" is described as a harm in and of itself. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY,
supra note 17, at 151 (describing the "harm of increased accessibility").
152 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 157 (quoting Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 449 (N.Y. 1902) (Gray, J., dissenting)).
153 Id. at 16o; see id. at 147 (opining that exposure "often creates embarrassment and
humiliation" especially if it involves "information about our bodies and health" or
information society deems "animal-like or disgusting").
154 See id. at 148 ("We protect against the exposure of these bodily aspects because this
protection safeguards human dignity as defined by modern society. Dignity is a part of
being civilized; it involves the ability to transcend one's animal nature.") (citation omitted);
see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 196 (suggesting that "modern enterprise and
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected [man] to mental pain and
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury").
155 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 107-o8 ("[P]eople expect to be
looked at when they ride the bus or subway, but persistent gawking can create feelings of
anxiety and discomfort.").
1s6 Id. at 163 ("[I]ntrusion can cause harm even if no information is involved [because]
intrusion often interferes with solitude-the state of being alone or able to retreat from the
presence of others.").
157 Id. at 162; see Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 195 (defining right "to be let alone")
(citation omitted); Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that "right to be let alone" is "the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men").
1s8 The Internet and related technologies reportedly escalate the harm of the exposure
because they "transform gossip into a widespread and permanent stain." SOLOVE, FUTURE
OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 181; see also Solove, supra note 1, at 969 ("Without
warning, anyone can broadcast another's unguarded moments ... of youthful
awkwardness to an audience of millions" and, via Internet archives, "ensure that
embarrassing material follows a victim for life.").
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staining reportedly "makes a person [feel like] a 'prisoner of his
recorded past,"159 and sacrifices the exposed person's opportunity at a
second chance.16o Ultimately, these threats may cause one to feel like
she has lost control over her entire selfl 6l and give others an
inaccurate 6 2 picture of her.
2. HARM TO THINKING SPACE
The second category of harm the Obscurity Problem allegedly
causes, involves more than realized or feared internal feelings of lost
dignity; rather, it involves changed behavior of individuals, which, in
turn, causes harm to society as a whole. In particular, the failure to
protect people from the Obscurity Problem reportedly threatens to
harm their expressive activities and the personal relationships that
foster such activities.163 Depriving someone of "breathing space" in
159 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 145 (citation omitted).
160 Solove, supra note 1, at 1053. "One of the values of protecting privacy is facilitating
growth and reformation." Id. at 1054 (acknowledging that "[e]veryone has done things and
regretted them later" and suggesting that "[t]here is a great value in allowing individuals
the opportunity to wipe the slate clean" in order to "further society's interest in providing
people with incentives and room to change and grow").
161 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 153 (concluding that "the more
people know about us, the more they can exercise control over us"). SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 154 (warning that "[t]hreatening to
disseminate information can achieve levels of domination that may not be socially
beneficial").
162 Many claim that this kind of exposure is inaccurate because it is incomplete. Solove,
supra note 1, at 1035-36 (endorsing Jeffrey Rosen's observation that "[p]rivacy protects us
from being misdefined and judged out of context in a world of short attention spans, a
world in which information can easily be confused with knowledge"); Lipton, supra note
17, at 927-29 (discussing harmful misinterpretation that occurs when one's image is taken
out of context); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAzE 9 (2000) ("[W]hen intimate
information is removed from its original context and revealed to strangers, we are
vulnerable to being misjudged on the basis of our most embarrassing.., tastes and
preferences.").
163 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 78 ("Privacy problems impede
certain activities, and the value of privacy emerges from the value of preserving these
activities."); ROSEN, supra note 162, at 8 ("In order to flourish, the intimate relationships
on which trie knowledge of another person depends need space as well as time:
sanctuaries from the gaze of the crowd in which slow mutual self-disclosure is possible.")
(citing SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 79-80).
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public, it is argued, also deprives him of his "freedom of thought,"164
whether alone or with others,165 which also triggers First Amendment
freedom of association concerns.166
With respect to the need for individual "thinking space," scholars
have stated that obscurity "preserve[s] space for new ideas to
develop."'167 Without some privacy in public, people will lose the
"moments for intellectual and spiritual contemplation" that privacy in
public provides. 168 This type of harm occurs regardless of whether the
exposure actually happens or not.169 The actual or threatened loss of
obscurity chills not only political but also creative expression because
people wish to avoid having their ideas "prematurely leaked to the
world, where harsh judgments might crush them." 170 A sense of
private space in public also reportedly is crucial to intellectual
relationships with others, especially political ones. Specifically, "public
surveillance can have chilling effects that make people less likely to
164 Richards, supra note 61, at 1324-25; SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17,
at 169.
165 This argument appears supported by an emerging scholarly effort to draw a line around,
and better protect, "intellectual privacy." See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual
Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008). To define when intellectual privacy interests are at
stake, one asks "'whether the information being sought is relevant to the activities of
thinking, reading and discussion safeguarded by the First Amendment." If the answer is
"'yes," then a higher level of protection should result. Richards, supra note 61, at 1349.
166 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741 (2008).
167 Richards, supra note 61, at 46; Richards, supra note 165, at 412-16 (arguing that spatial
privacy is necessary for thought development).
168 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 79 (citing material from Joseph
Bensman and Arnold Simmel); Cohen, supra note 102, at 1377 ("We must carve out
protected zones of personal autonomy, so that productive expression and development can
have room to flourish.")
169 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 143 (opining that the mere "'risk of
disclosure can prevent people from engaging in activities that further their own self-
development" and "inhibit people from associating with others"); Solove, Conceptualizing
Privacy, supra note 92, at 1121 (quoting Gerstein for principle that "intimate relationships
simply could not exist if we did not [have] privacy for them"); Richards, supra note 165, at
403 ("In a world of widespread public and private scrutiny, novel but unpopular ideas
would have little room to breathe ... and original ideas would have no refuge in which to
develop.").
170 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 8o.
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associate with certain groups, attend rallies, or speak at meetings."'171
Privacy and obscurity allegedly "underwrite[] the freedom to vote, to
hold political discussions, and to associate freely away from the glare
of the public and without fear of reprisal."172 Further, whether
individually or in groups, protection against disclosure "also facilitates
the reading and consumption of ideas."'173 This is because disclosure,
coupled with the perceived permanency of the Internet "attaches
informational baggage to people" so that a thought exposed once will
be associated with that person permanently.174 Ultimately, as "a tool of
social control," the Obscurity Problem purportedly "cause[s] [a]
person to alter her behavior [through] self-censorship and inhibition,"
thus reducing the number of helpful activities for society.75
3. HOW THE OBSCURITY PROBLEM HARMS ARE
OVERSTATED VIA ASSUMPTIONS
Simply, and perhaps harshly stated, the primary alleged harms of
an Obscurity Problem are that: (i) it makes the exposed person feel
bad about himself, sometimes for a very long time, and (ii) it makes
some people think twice before they share their thoughts or actions
with others in public. Both harms are based on certain questionable
assumptions, each of which is challenged below.
171 Id. at 112.
172 Solove, supra note 1, at 993 (quoting OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3
(1996)); Solove, supra note 1, at 993-94 (concluding that "without privacy, people might
not communicate many ideas" and that threat of disclosure "probably will not end all
conversations, but it will alter what is said"); Richards, supra note 61, at 1341-42
(suggesting that in order to -govern themselves," citizens need "space [free] from state
scrutiny of their beliefs, thoughts, and emotions"').
173 See Solove, supra note 1, at 992 (citing Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A
Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981, 1012-13
(1996)).
174 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 124.
175 Id. at 1o8.
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a. Refuting Assumptions that the Dignity Harm is Permanent,
Irrefutable, and Quantifiable
The first harm most often associated with the Obscurity Problem
is a loss of dignity or other emotional harm felt by the person exposed
and by persons who fear such exposure. 176 I do not question that some
people subjected to the Obscurity Problem suffer some emotional
harm that causes them sincere pain.177 However, I do question
whether this harm, as some scholars appear to have assumed or
argued, is permanent, irrefutable, and quantifiable.
The first assumption that potentially exaggerates the dignity harm
is the assumption that such harm is permanent7 8 As noted above,
some scholars claim that the Obscurity Problem makes one a
"prisoner of his recorded past," suggesting that once one is exposed,
one permanently drags around the exposed information like a tattoo
or like a ball and chain around one's neck.'79 However, a cursory
"where are they now"-style Internet search for the most oft-cited
victims of the Obscurity Problem,18° reveals that many were not
damaged as much as one initially would think. Others that initially
were harmed have returned to or risen to positions objectively better
than before the exposure. For example, "Star Wars Kid," now a young
adult, serves as President of a conservation society while studying for
176 See supra notes 141-59 and accompanying text (discussing dignity harm and
acknowledging that it includes other related harms such as increased anxiety); see M. Ryan
Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1145 (2011) (documenting
examples of dignity harm under the label of "subjective harm").
177 See supra notes 141-59 and accompanying text.
178 SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 94 ("One of the chief drawbacks of
Internet shaming is the permanence of its effects.... Being shamed in cyberspace is akin to
being marked for life."). In part, this argument appears to suggest that we should be more
afraid of information when it is more permanent, a suggestion that also could support
limiting hardcover books because they are more durable and longer-lasting than
paperbacks.
179 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 145; see SOLOVE, FUTURE OF
REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 94 (suggesting that being exposed for public conduct via the
Internet is "similar to being forced to wear a digital scarlet letter or being branded or
tattooed").
18o See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
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his law degree at McGill.181 Jonas Blank, the law firm associate whose
profanely critical email traveled around the world, was hired full-time
by the same top law firm he criticized.182 Countless others had their
fifteen minutes of undignified fame fade even before or shortly after
rising to the pitied status of an "example used in privacy scholar's
work."8 3 Further, the average shelf-life of any documented dignity
harm likely will fade even more rapidly as more people are exposed,
i.e., as the democratization of exposure expands.184 This is because the
increased amount of information available about individuals, and the
ever-decreasing window of time during which a single piece of
information remains in the public's collective interest, makes any one
exposure less and less noticeable., 85 In sum, as more information
about more people is made available in a shorter and shorter news
cycle, the staying power of any one exposure is limited and the
supposed permanence of the dignity harm grows ever more
questionable. 86
18l See Alex Pasternack, After Lawsuits and Therapy, Star Wars Kid is Back,
MOTHERBOARD (June 1, 2010), http://motherboard.vice.com/201o/6/1/after-lawsuits-
and-therapy-star-wars-kid-is-back.
182 The law firm, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, offered Mr. Blank a full-time
position with the firm, which he accepted. He now works at a different New York City law
firm. See David Lat, Our Favorite Skadden Associate Moves On, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 30,
2007, 2:36 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2007/03/our-favorite-skadden-associate-
moves-on.
183 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1444-45 (discussing how Solove's depictions of exposed
individuals perhaps perpetuates the very harm he identifies as troubling).
184 See Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test
for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 833, 833-34 (2006) (referencing "the
democratization of the means of mass communication spurred by modern technology" as
reason to question the public figure doctrine in defamation law).
185 See Gloria Franke, Note, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: Will One Test
Ever Capture the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 989 (noting "democratization of
celebrity" and the power of the Internet to "empower[] the formerly voiceless") (citation
omitted).
186 1 suspect that some exposed persons, like the public at large, subjectively do not
experience the harm others project upon them. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, The Privacy Hoax,
FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 42, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2oo2/1o14/o42.html (discussing how consumer behavior
regarding privacy demonstrates a lack of sincere interest in personal privacy and, on that
basis, questioning the need for additional government regulation).
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The dignity harm also may be overstated because it appears based,
at least in part, on the assumption that the victim of the harm cannot
reduce the harm by responding in her defense. After an exposure,
some serious emotional damage may have been done; however, that
does not mean that it cannot be mitigated. Every alleged victim of an
exposure has the opportunity to post a reply and many are quite
effective. 187 Even Dog Poop Girl posted an online apology.188
Additionally, exposure on the Internet unleashes a mob of eager fact-
checkers, raring to go and expose the initial citizen journalist as a
fraud. For example, when Department of Agriculture official Shirley
Sherrod was falsely "exposed" for saying, on tape, that she
purposefully refused to help a farmer of a different race than her own,
but further, near-immediate exposure, through the posting of and
commentary regarding the entire tape, revealed that she in fact did
help the farmer and that she learned a great lesson regarding race and
class in society. 89 In this respect, exposing the information to a large
mass of people simultaneously helped improve the accuracy of the
information. This automatic "right to reply" has not always been
available (simply put, not everyone owned a newspaper) but now, the
very technology some vilify is the same technology that empowers a
reply.190 And, most importantly, every reply reduces the harm
associated with the exposure and loss of obscurity. 191
187 See Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and "Blurry-Edged" Social Networks, 50
B.C. L. REv. 1315, 1315-16 (2009) ("For the first time in history, the economics of
publishing place the individual speaker on even ground with institutional speakers" such
that "any person can tell her story to the world.").
188 See Dog Poo Girl, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/dog-poo-
girl# (last updated Nov. 7, 2011) (providing screen capture of apology).
189 See Viveca Novak, Shirley Sherrod's Contextual Nightmare, FACTCHECK.ORG, (July 21,
2OLO), http://www.factcheck.org/2o10/07/shirley-sherrods-contextual-nightmare.
19o See Perzonowski, supra, note 184, at 836 (contrasting the difficulty of responding to a
newspaper's accusations with the relative ease of responding to an online source's
publication of the same accusations and concluding that, with the latter, the "easiest and
most effective strategy is simply to correct the misinformation through [one's] own
response"). As Perzonowski states, "In the time it would take to contact a lawyer, [someone
wrongly exposed online] could compose a response that would counter the misinformation
and prevent or repair any harm to her reputation." Id. at 836.
191 The reporting of, and replies to, more reputation-related information in turn will likely
lead to more complete and more accurate assessments of an individual's actual qualities.




Finally, the dignity harm often is overstated because it cannot be
quantified. Emotional harm is inherently subjective.192 The only one
who accurately can quantify the harm is the person affected, and there
is no direct way for the rest of us to get inside her head and feel the
harm in the same way she feels it. This difficulty has led, at least in
part, to the law's skepticism of emotional harm, especially when the
alleged harm was caused by the sharing of truthful information. For
example, a privacy tort plaintiff must be able to point to a specific
harm, such as a reputational loss, versus mere "hurt feelings," in order
to obtain damages.193 The Supreme Court, too, has expressed a
reluctance to limit speech based on its potential to hurt feelings. 194
Although it remains possible to assess the harm on an objective basis,
assuming a rational, reasonable audience,95 the currently
unquantifiable nature of emotional harm makes the dignity harm a
weak leg on which to support a right to obscurity.9 6 Further, to the
extent it can be quantified, the dignity harm likely is offset by the
emotional benefits of exposure, as discussed in Part B below.
b. Refuting the Assumptions that Private Thinking Space in Public is
Necessary and Unavailable
The next harm-previously described as the destruction of
perceived "thinking space"-is also overstated due to its apparent
reliance on a questionable assumption. Namely, this harm assumes
that a public, yet somewhat secure space absolutely free from later
reporting by anyone of what has transpired there is necessary for, and
helpful to thought development and free association, especially
192 See Calo, supra note 176, at 1145 (describing various subjective harms).
193 See Richards, supra note 61, at 1345 ("[A] hallmark of modern American First
Amendment jurisprudence is that hurt feelings alone cannot justify the suppression of
truthful information or opinion.").
194 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (striking down an
ordinance that criminalized conduct which caused mere hurt feelings).
195 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 802-04 (discussing Supreme Court justices'
"'constitutional preference for standards based on a rational audience rather than a real
one").
196 Richards, supra note 61, at 1346 ("As Brandeis himself implicitly recognized later in life,
a tort-based conception of privacy protecting against purely emotional harm must remain
exceptional in a constitutional regime dedicated to speech, publicity, and disclosure.").
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political thought and association. More pointedly, some seem to fear
that if we let regular people report what they see and hear to millions
of others at the click of a button, no one will say the important things
that need to be said. 197
Although some people rightfully may feel that potential exposure
discourages them from engaging in thoughtful debate,,98 others may
feel that potential exposure to a huge and immediate audience
encourages sharing and debate. In fact, the inherent appeal of
reaching such a broad audience likely is partly responsible for the
meteoric rise in the use of social networking sites like Twitter and
Facebook. On these sites and elsewhere, many individuals and groups
seek out exposure and publicity for their ideas, rather than hide from
them. Their reasons for doing so presumably range from egotism or
vanity to more utilitarian reasons, such as the fact that speaking with
someone else about your thoughts often improves them or the fact
that making one's ideas known helps them to spread and gain favor.
Regardless of the precise reason that people share ideas with others, it
simply cannot be said with convincing authority that people generally
need a public-yet-private incubator for their secret camaraderie and
thoughts. 199 Further, encouraging some people to pause before they
share a thought may result in beneficial self-censorship.2° ° Thus, the
197 This argument also appears fundamentally flawed given that societies with less spatial
privacy than we enjoy today apparently were able to think and write just fine. See Posner,
supra note 16, at 407 (showing how "history does not teach that privacy is a precondition
to creativity or individuality" because "these qualities have flourished in societies ... that
had much less privacy than we in the United States have today").
198 For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
("NAACP") famously argued that state-mandated disclosure of its membership lists would
deter free enjoyment of the right to associate. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)
("It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups
engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the
forms of governmental action in the cases above were thought likely to produce upon the
particular constitutional rights there involved.")
199 See Posner, supra note 16, at 408-09. Daniel Solove has acknowledged that not all
observation of one's thinking violates privacy. SoLoVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra
note 17, at 86-87 ("Suppose I peek through your window and see that you are reading a
book by Rousseau. I learned information about your consumption of ideas, which
ultimately involves information about your identity. Without more details, however, it is
hard to see how my snooping rises to the level of kidnapping.").
200 See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 64-66 (2009)
(documenting serious societal harms triggered by the "growth of anonymous online mobs
that attack women, people of color, religious minorities, gays, and lesbians"); Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John Doe?, 5o B.C.
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"thinking space" harm likely has been overstated and obscurity is not
a necessary prerequisite for thought generation and association.
Various legal sources support the idea that the lack of public-yet-
private thinking space is an acceptable lack of obscurity rather than a
serious harm. Perhaps the most recent and direct challenge to the idea
that lack of thinking space in public is a serious harm comes from the
Supreme Court in its recent decision, Doe v. Reed.201 In Doe, the
Supreme Court held that state disclosure of the names and addresses
of those who sign petitions in support of ballot referenda does not
categorically violate the petition signers' First Amendment speech
rights.202 In challenging the state statute requiring such disclosure, the
signers of an anti-gay rights petition had argued that disclosing their
names and addresses would chill speech, expose them to harassment
and deprive them of privacy for their thoughts.203 This argument
tracks that of privacy scholars who suggest that little to no obscurity
will chill expression and thought development.204 The Doe v. Reed
Court rejected this argument in an eight to one decision.205
Specifically, the Court found that the state law was a constitutional
disclosure requirement that "may burden the ability to speak, but
L. REv. 1373, 1383 (2009) (labeling anonymity a "double-edged sword" because "it makes
public discussion more uninhibited, robust, and wide-open than ever before, but it also
opens the door to more trivial, abusive, libelous, and fraudulent speech"); cf. Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences and Anonymous Speech, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1573-74 (2007) (categorizing intrinsic benefits of anonymous
speech).
201 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
202 Id. at 2815. Before reaching its ultimate holding, the court determined that the signing
of the petition was an expressive act, id. at 2818, and that disclosure requirements are
subject to "exacting scrutiny," under which a "sufficiently important governmental
interest" must be found. Id. In Doe, the Court ruled that the state's interest in preserving
the integrity of its electoral process was sufficient. Id. at 2820.
203 Id. at 2820 (expressing concern that publicizing names and addresses provided a
"blueprint for harassment and intimidation").
204 See supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text (summarizing other scholars'
suggestion that "thinking space" "underwrites the freedom to ... associate freely away
from the glare of the public and without fear of reprisal").
20, Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2821. The Court left the door open to an "as applied" challenge if
petitioners could show that disclosure would, as applied to their particular case, cause
enough harm to their First Amendment rights and personal safety. Id. (citations omitted).
The holding also may be limited to actions that, like petition signing, have a "legal effect"
similar to legislation. Id. at 2818 n.1.
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[does] not prevent anyone from speaking."o 6 In so finding, the court
rejected a call for more privacy to facilitate activities deemed
"intellectual,"27 at least when they have a lawmaking effect.2o Thus,
in at least one context, the Supreme Court has considered and rejected
the "lack of thinking space" privacy harm as a reason to restrict the
exposure of truthful information.
Another legal reality that undermines the perceived lack of
thinking space harm is the fact that there already are adequate
methods to obtain legal protection for one's ideas and thoughts when
necessary-namely, confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements. 20 9 If
secrecy of publicized thought truly is valuable enough to someone, it
can be obtained via an express agreement prior to or after it is
shared.2o Admittedly, obtaining such agreements involves various
2o6 Id. at 2813-14 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
207 See Richards, supra note 61, at 1343 (suggesting that Supreme Court's alleged regard for
intellectual privacy "holds a much greater degree of promise to better understand and
resolve modern problems of privacy"); see also id. at 1343 (characterizing Warren and
Brandeis's style of privacy as "a jurisprudential dead end" given conflict with First
Amendment).
218 Justice Scalia was most skeptical of the urged need for thinking space, stating as
follows: "[H]arsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our people have traditionally
been willing to pay for self governance. Requiring people to stand up in public for their
political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed. For my part, I do
not look forward to a society which, thanks to the Supreme Court, campaigns anonymously
... and even exercises the direct democracy of initiative and referendum hidden from
public scrutiny and protected from the accountability of criticism. This does not resemble
the Home of the Brave." Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
209 See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability,
1O9 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1650, 1654 (2009) (describing use of confidentiality agreements to
protect privacy) (citations omitted).
21o In the absence of an express agreement, one may pursue a claim for breach of an
implied duty of confidentiality in special circumstances, typically those involving a
fidutiary relationship. See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961)
(bank); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985) (doctor); Rich v. N.Y. Cent. &
Hudson River R.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382, 390 (1882) (lawyer); Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant
& Co., 482 N.E.2d 955, 961 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (accountant) (cited in Solove and
Richards, supra note 209, at 1653 n.1o and accompanying text); see also Neil M. Richards
& Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO.
L.J. 123, 157 (2007). Some have argued for extension of the implied duty of confidentiality
to intimate private relationships and even to mere friends. See Ethan J. Lieb, Friends as
Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 665, 668 (2009); Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell:
Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of
Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 887, 908 (2006); Andrew J. McClurg, Bringing Privacy
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transaction costs that may deter their use by some speakers. However,
the ubiquitous availability of these legal options at least questions
whether one absolutely needs a right to obscurity in order to develop
thought. Accordingly, the "thinking space" harm likely has been
overstated.
Sunshine laws and the benefits they have produced also call into
question the need for privacy in public in order to facilitate thought
development.211 One subset of sunshine laws generally requires
governmental policy-related meetings to be open to the public and, in
many cases, recorded, and even posted on a website.12 Similarly,
many federal and state agencies require that people meeting with
agency officials file a written notice describing what was discussed.213
Further, our nation has a history of open town meetings.24 If those
most directly responsible for making public policy decisions do not
need privacy in public, then it is at least questionable whether those
with a more remote role need such absolute privacy either.
Finally, much of the most justifiable fear regarding deprivation of
thinking space is triggered only when the state is the one collecting the
information or when the information collection is a constant,
pervasive threat.215 The Obscurity Problem involves neither state-
based nor constant surveillance. State surveillance is not directly
involved because it is "Little Stranger," and not "Big Brother," that is
Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L.
REv. 989, lO85-86 (1995).
211 Many of these laws are so-named because Louis Brandeis, years after co-authoring The
Right to Privacy, famously stated that "[slunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants."
Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEYAND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (1914).
212 See generally Daxton R. Stewart, Let the Sunshine In, Or Else: An Examination of the
"Teeth" of State and Federal Open Meetings and Open Records Laws, 15 COMM. L. & POL'Y
265 (2010) (reviewing current status of sunshine laws at federal and state level including
enforcement of and relief under such laws).
213 See Heidi Reamer Anderson, Allocating Influence, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 683, 693-94
(collecting and summarizing agency rules regarding ex parte meeting notices).
214 See James Assaf, Note, Mr. Smith Comes Home: The Constitutional Presumption of
Openness in Local Legislative Meetings, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 229-30(1990)
(documenting existence of sunshine laws in all fifty states requiring public access to local
government meetings) (citations omitted).
215 See Richards, supra note 61, at 1351 (concluding that Brandeis was most concerned
when privacy protection was threatened "principally [by] the state rather than the press");
but see Richards, supra note 61, at 1347-50 (documenting threats to "intellectual
privacy").
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collecting the information.21 6 When it is one's fellow citizens versus
one's government officials doing the exposing, freedom of association
and related issues are less of a concern. 217 Second, arguments
regarding surveillance's potential to chill expression are most
persuasive when the surveillance is constant, versus intermittent.218
With the Obscurity Problem, surveillance is only occasional-and thus
less of a threat to "thinking space."219
B. BENEFITS OF EXPOSURE
Just as we must "value privacy on the basis of the range of
activities it protects" we also must consider the range of activities that
protecting privacy would impede, i.e., the range of activities precluded
by the privacy protections themselves.22° Although some scholars
initially identify some of these benefits of exposure of public conduct
or information,221 there is no comprehensive recognition,
categorization, and aggregation of exposure's benefits in the privacy
216 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 133; see also Calo, supra note 176,
at 1157-59 (reviewing Solove's references to Orwell and Kafka and suggesting that lack of
privacy is better viewed as a contributor to societal harms than as a separate and distinct
harm in itself).
217 They still remain a concern, however, given the government's reported use of privately-
collected information. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale III, Network
Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2011).
218 See Calo, supra note 176, at 1155 (suggesting that harm to privacy is best measured by
multiplying "the degree of aversion" to the privacy intrusion by "the extent of [the]
surveillance" and thus finding more harm when "the extent of the surveillance is
enormous"); Josh Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public and the Right to
Your Digital Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual's Image
Over the Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 327-34 (2009) (distinguishing harms from
constant or ever-present surveillance, labeled "omniveillance," from lesser harms caused
by occasional photographs).
219 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 8o-81 (discussing critics of the
need for privacy for intellectual thought, including professors Hannah Arendt, Yao-Huai
Lu, Richard Posner, and Richard Epstein).
220 Id. at 98-99.
221 See id. at 123, 187 (acknowledging that identification "can reduce fraud and enhance
accountability" and that "many privacy problems emerge as a result of efficacious activities,
much as pollution is an outgrowth of industrial production").
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literature. This section aims to fill that gap, beginning with a
discussion of how exposure keeps government officials accountable.222
1. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY BENEFITS
Daniel Solove claims that "dog poop girl would have been just a
vague image in a few people's memories if it hadn't been for the photo
entering cyberspace and spreading around faster than an
epidemic."223 While this may be true, and may be deemed a net gain
for society in that one instance, this does not mean that legally
preventing or discouraging exposures of people's public behavior
always results in a net gain for society. Recall the police brutality story
from the Introduction involving Officer Walsh. Do we want events like
that to be "vague image[s] in a few people's memories? '"224 Of course
not, because exposure of such images holds our government officials
accountable, inspires public debate, and often leads to real policy
changes. However, such benefits could be sacrificed in that situation
and others like it if the person who videotaped the event did not post
it to YouTube because he had a legal duty to protect the obscurity of
Officer Walsh or of other people at the scene.
In trying to prevent harm suffered by the Dog Poop Girls of the
world, we risk losing exposure of public behavior that should be
further seen, heard, discussed, and addressed.225 Consider the many
recent exposures of public officials at public events with other people
nearby about which we may not have learned (or at least not seen) if
the law protected people's obscurity in public:
222 My categorization of these exposure benefits is a preliminary and perhaps less
sophisticated attempt to do what Daniel Solove does for privacy harms in Understanding
Privacy. Some of these benefits have speech elements and thus relate to many First
Amendment arguments already made elsewhere. However, in the instant context of a
pragmatic balancing of harms and benefits, it is more appropriate to discuss them in non-
speech terms, and perhaps mention the benefit's connection to the First Amendment in
passing, just as pro-privacy scholars have done. In this respect, a benefit's relationship with
the First Amendment increases its weight in the balance, but does not change its existence.
Or, more concisely, one could consider the First Amendment as a thumb on the scale
pushing down in favor of exposure.
223 SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 8.
224 Id.
225 See Solove, supra note 1, at 973 ("Privacy impedes discourse, impairs autonomy in
communication, and prevents accountability for one's conduct.").
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" Anti-gay comments made by candidate for New
York Governor, Carl Paladino, in a meeting with
religious leaders;226
" Then Governor of South Carolina, Mark
Sanford's, emails to the woman with whom he
was having an extra-marital affair, and
suggestions to his staff to account for his
absences during these affairs by falsely stating
that he was "hiking the Appalachian trail; "227
" The reference by George Allen, a candidate for
Virginia's U.S. Senate seat, to an opponent's
aide as "Macaca," which many interpreted as a
racist statement equating the aide to a Macaque
monkey;228
* Then Senate Majority Leader Trent Lot's
birthday party statement suggesting that had
civil-rights opponent and fellow Senator Strom
Thurmond been elected president in 1948, on a
pro-segregation platform, "we wouldn't have
had all these problems over the years;"229 and
226 See Simone Weichselbaum & Kenneth Lovett, Carl Paladino Accused of "Stunning
Homophobia"After Anti-Gay Rant at Meeting with Jewish Leaders, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Oct. 10, 2010, 5:10 PM), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2olo-lo-
lo/local/27o77787_1 civil-unions-gay-marriage-bill-gay-pride-parade.
227 South Carolina Gov. Sanford Admits Extramarital Affair, CNN (June 24, 2009, 9:29
PM EDT),
http://www.cnn.com/2oo9/POLITICS/o6/24/south.carolina.governor/index.html.
228 Tim Craig & Michael D. Shear, Allen Quip Provokes Outrage, Apology, WASH. POST,
Aug. 15, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2oo6/o8/14/AR2oo6o814oo589.html.
229 Thomas B. Edsall, Lott Decried for Part of Salute to Thurmond, WASH. POST, Dec. 7,




Pictures posted on a website by Ninth Circuit
Judge Alex Kozinski, depicting nude women
painted to look like farm animals.230
Any one of these or similar exposures of public conduct or
statements may have been precluded or at least "chilled" if the law
recognized a right to obscurity. As a result, the helpful discussions and
consequences these exposures motivated may not have occurred.
Thus, there is a risk that providing a general right to obscurity would
sacrifice significant governmental accountability benefits. In the end,
"keeping pertinent information about public affairs out of the hands of
the public is equally problematic," regardless of whether the
information's source is a "citizen journalist" or a more traditional
journalist.231
2. BEHAVIORAL-IMPROVEMENT BENEFITS
There also is significant value in continuing to apply the "no
privacy in public" rule to everyone instead of applying it only to public
officials. Just as the possibility of getting caught and punished acts
deters crime, the possibility of getting exposed for public statements
or behavior deters non-criminal but still objectively-undesirable
behavior.232 Daniel Solove calls this type of exposure "norm policing,"
but this term is too pejorative for something that holds so much
potential for benefitting society. Solove claims that "[w]e do not view
the victims [of exposure] as blameworthy, and there is little social
value in their suffering."233 I disagree. This alleged suffering, in the
form of lost dignity and lost obscurity, can lead to significant social
value-and even save lives.
230 Scott Glover, 9th Circuit's Chief Judge Posted Sexually Explicit Matter on His Website,
L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-kozinskil2-
2oo8jun12,o,6220192.story.
231 See Strahilevitz, Reunifying, supra note 35, at 12.
232 See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949
(2003); SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 80-81, 92 ("Internet shaming
has many benefits. Without shaming, people like the dog poop girl, the subway flasher, and
the creep who harasses women in the street would often go unpunished. In a world of
increasingly rude and uncivil behavior, shaming helps society maintain its norms of civility
and etiquette.").
233 See Solove, supra note 42, at 538.
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In Order Without Law, Robert Ellickson discussed the behavioral
benefits of exposure. 234 In a more recent and more specific study, Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz demonstrated how additional exposure of people's
reckless driving habits could reduce deaths on our highways-the
number one cause of death among those aged fifteen to twenty-
nine. 235 Strahilevitz first showed how protecting motorist obscurity
leads to rude, dangerous, and even life-threatening behavior.236 Next,
he demonstrated how reducing driver obscurity through exposure by
fellow citizens, and holding drivers accountable for their actions, has
led to better and safer driving among some "exposed" groups and
promises such benefits for society should the exposed groups be
expanded.37 Indeed, Strahilevitz has shown how facilitating closeness
and more "norm policing" may work better than the tort system itself
as a way of curtailing and punishing bad behavior.238
Fewer people cutting us off or tailgating us may save lives. On a
more abstract level, additional exposure and less obscurity, promise to
increase happiness as well, on the highways and elsewhere.39 Fewer
instances of other bad behavior may make life more enjoyable in
various other contexts-primarily those in which obscurity authorizes
234 Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991);
see Schwartz, supra note 7, at 144o-42 (explaining how Ellickson's work is pro-disclosure
in part because it recognizes that "if the law can help reputational information circulate
more freely, people will work harder to maintain the good opinion of others").
235 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving"for Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1699, 1712 (2006).
236 Strahilevitz, supra note 235, at 1705 (reviewing highway safety studies and concluding
that "[t]he problems associated with urban and suburban driving are, by and large,
creatures of motorist anonymity").
237 Id. at 1708-12.
238 Id. at 1724-26.
239 Strahilevitz demonstrated how exposure of drivers would increase happiness-an
increase that likely would offset any other type of emotional harm suffered by the exposed
drivers. Id. at 1702 ("Recent economic research has placed commuting at the very bottom
of the happiness index, easily ranking as the least pleasurable major life activity in which
Americans engage."); id. at 1729 ("While the costs associated with driver deaths and
injuries are quite substantial, they may well be dwarfed by the sheer unhappiness
associated with commutes to and from work."); id. at 1730 (discussing economists' studies
regarding the value of happiness).
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and perhaps encourages objectionable behavior.24 ° For example,
exposing poor tippers online has made servers who felt cheated feel
better simply by reporting them; such exposure, in turn, may make
patrons more courteous and more generous. Similarly, exposure of
unruly hotel, sports stadium, or airport patrons could make visiting
such places more enjoyable for all.241 If the potential for getting
exposed for saying something extremely harmful to someone else
actually changes someone's behavior-and prevents the harm that
would have been caused-then this changed behavior is a benefit of
the "no privacy in public" rule and is another benefit supporting the
rule's retention.
3. CRIMINAL DETERRENCE, REPORTING, AND INTEGRITY BENEFITS
The fruits of exposure can be even more beneficial to society when
it is a criminal act, versus happiness-reducing rudeness, that is subject
to exposure. Louis Brandeis's suggestion that sunlight is the best
disinfectant permeates popular culture and legal discourse.42 Often
forgotten, however, is the second part of Brandeis's sunlight quote:
and "electric light the most efficient policeman."243 As Brandeis
suggested, exposure that leads to reduced obscurity for would-be
criminals can be quite efficient at deterring crime, improving the
integrity of the criminal justice system, and increasing the reporting of
crimes, as discussed below.
As Daniel Solove has conceded, "social control can be beneficial..
[f]or example, surveillance can serve as a deterrent to crime."244 In
Great Britain, a government surveillance program using closed-circuit
cameras (CCTV) reportedly has reduced street crimes in some areas
by fifty percent or more.245 Although the Obscurity Problem includes,
240 See Cohen supra note 92, at 196 ("Maybe we don't want people to litter or spread
germs, or to drive aggressively, and if the potential for exposure reduces the incidence of
those behaviors, so much the better.").
241 Strahilevitz, supra note 235, at 1763.
242 See generally, Seth F. Kramer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension
between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1991).
243 BRANDEIS, supra note 211, at 92.
244 Solove, supra note 42, at 493-94.
245 See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 223 (2002); Shane McGlaun, London CCTV
System Caught Over 2,500 Criminals in 2010, DAiLYTECH (Dec. 28, 2010, 12:20 PM),
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by definition, only exposure by private persons versus governments, it
is possible if not likely that private exposure has a similar, albeit less
comprehensive, deterrent effect on crime as more comprehensive,
government-led surveillance would have. Further, if Britain's CCTV is
any indication, the crime-deterring effects come burdened with
minimal "thinking space" or other harms.246 The increased feeling of
safety then improves citizen well-being across the board, leading to
additional self-liberty, not less.247
For the many crimes that will occur despite the presence of citizen
journalists, exposure of public conduct likely will continue to assist in
the reporting of crimes as well as in the apprehension and prosecution
of the correct perpetrators. For example, citizens have used their cell
phone cameras to expose drivers involved in "hit and run" accidents in
ways that led to their eventual arrest.248 Similarly, some citizens
reluctant to report crimes in-person have been willing to report crimes
via cell phone text messages including photographs of the alleged
perpetrators.249 Additionally, New York City residents now may report
crimes via uploading their pictures or videos to a government
websiteO.25 The freedom to expose others' public actions even
http://www.dailytech.com/London+CCTV+System+Caught+over+2500+
Criminals+in+2010/article2o501.htm. But see Slobogin, supra, at 223-225 (sharing
conflicting data regarding the effects of closed circuit monitoring on crime).
246 See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 1o8 (acknowledging that
Britain's CCTV, "is widely perceived as 'a friendly eye in the sky, not Big Brother but a
kindly and watchful uncle or aunt"). I am unaware of any reports that the amount of
productive thought coming out of Britain has declined since the time the cameras have
been in use.
247 As one commentator has noted, "[a]rguments that claim that an open society must
accept a certain amount of crime fail to recognize that individual liberties are often
sacrificed when an individual's safety and security are forfeited." DENNIS BAILEY, THE OPEN
SOCIETY PARADOX 71 (2004) (discussing how use of DNA could have caught a rapist and
reduced other liberty-related harms such as those suffered by women who stayed indoors,
bought guns, and endured needless fear and anxiety).
248 See Ron Zurko, The Impact of Cell Phones on Crime, EHOW,
http://www.ehow.com/about-5398414-impact-cell-phones-crime.html (last visited Jan.
4, 2012).
249 See Cops Ask Public for Text-Message Crime Tips, FOXNEWS.COM (July 3, 2oo8),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/o,2933,375486,oo.html.
250 See Deborah Jian Lee, NYPD Calls on Citizens for Amateur Video Evidence, REUTERS
(July 31, 2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticnews/idUSN313665o42oo8o7 (cited in Josh
Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital
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empowers some gutsy citizens to record and report the very criminals
that have hurt them.251
More broadly, social networks, chock-full of reports regarding
others' activities and whereabouts, have been and could continue to be
harnessed to locate and track criminals or lost children.22 These same
networks of citizen journalists and their exposures provide reliable
and truthful alibis for the wrongly-accused, thereby improving the
integrity of the system and ensuring that the right person eventually is
caught.253 Further, replacing notoriously unreliable eyewitness
testimony with more reliable evidence of exposures documented via
still- and video-cameras also improves reliability.254 Ultimately, the
presence and use of what amounts to millions of mobile, citizen-
directed security cameras could vastly improve the integrity and
reliability of the criminal justice system, leading to improved safety
and liberty for all citizens.
4. EMOTIONAL AND THERAPEUTIC BENEFITS
Although privacy scholars carefully have identified the emotional
harms associated with the Obscurity Problem, they have not fully
accounted for the emotional benefits associated with exposure. A
Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual's Image Over the
Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 313, 332 (2009)).
251 See Police: Woman Took Pictures of Flasher, UPI (Jan. 15, 2oo9, 6:24 PM),
http://www.upi.com/Odd News/2009/01/15/Police-Woman-took-pictures-of-
flasher/UPI-525o1232o61864.
252 See Taking Pictures of Police Officers in Public Is Not a Crime, PoliceCrimes.com (July
24, 2010, 7:36 PM), http://www.policecrimes.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=26&t=9148
("Even in potential terrorism cases, the presence of lots of ordinary folks carrying cameras
actually enhances public security. In the hours after the failed Times Square car-bomb
attempt, officials.., sought out home movies shot by tourists.").
253 See, e.g., Damiano Beltrami, His Facebook Status Now? 'Charges Dropped,'
NYTIMES.COM, FG/CH NEWS (Nov. 11, 2009, 11:10 AM), http://fort-
greene.thelocal.nytimes.com/2oo9/11/11/his-facebook-status-now-charges-dropped
(documenting use of Facebook posting as alibi and broader trend that "Web
communications including photos and videos are providing evidence in legal battles
ranging from murder trials to employment lawsuits").
254 The unreliability of traditional eyewitness testimony has been well-documented. See,
e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 1o8 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 6o (2008) (showing
that seventy-nine percent of rape or murder exonerees in expansive study were convicted
based on incorrect eyewitness testimony).
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person who exposes another's public behavior via distributing a video
or story online often does so because sharing her take on the behavior
with others makes her feel better.255 Some describe the emotional
benefit of sharing a story via a personal blog as providing "a new kind
of intimacy, a sense that they are known and listened to."256 For
intensely personal autobiographical speech, the emotional benefits to
the speaker are even more pronounced and heart-felt.2s7 In fact, even
the performance of "Numa Numa Guy" has been described as a reason
to promote webcam recordings because his video exhibited pure
emotional enjoyment of a song.258 Thus, silencing one person to
protect the obscurity of another likely ends up sacrificing the
emotional interests of the one silenced.
Exposure of public conduct also leads to emotional benefits for
people similarly situated to the exposed person. When someone is
exposed in public for supposedly shameful conduct-such as
alcoholism-it often leads other people who engage in that conduct to
feel connected and no longer alone. This powerful emotional benefit is
why memoirs, a genre likely made impossible by a duty to protect
others' obscurity, are so powerful.259 In turn, the readers of such
truthful stories experience emotional benefits as well.
255 Posner, supra note 16, at 400 (noting how "lanyone who has ever sat next to a stranger
on a airplane or a ski lift knows the delight that people take in talking about themselves to
complete strangers").
256 See Emily Nussbaum, My So-Called Blog, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 11, 2004, at 33,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/ol/11/magazine/my-so-called-blog.html
(reviewing phenomenon of adolescent blogs and concluding that "[e]xposure may be
painful at times, but it's all part of the process of 'putting it out there,' risking judgment
and letting people in").
257 See Sonja R. West, The Story of Me: The Underprotection ofAutobiographical Speech,
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 905, 916-922 (2006) (carefully documenting the "American tradition
of autobiographical speech" and "the modern trend of public self-disclosure"); see also
Sonja R. West, The Story of Us: Resolving the Face-Off Between Autobiographical Speech
and Information Privacy, 67 WASH & LEE L. REV. 589 (2010) (proposing tort-based
solution to the apparent conflict between valuing autobiographical speech and privacy).
258 See Douglas Wolk, The Syncher, Not the Song: The Irresistible Rise of the Numa Numa
Dance, THE BELIEVER, June/July 2006, available at
http:/believermag.com/issues/20o6o6/?read=article wolk ("Brolsma's video
singlehandedly justifies the existence of webcams" because "[i]t's a movie of someone who
is having the time of his life, wants to share his joy with everyone, and doesn't care what
anyone else thinks."). Perhaps the positive feelings associated with exposure were part of
his motivation for starting his own NumaNetwork on YouTube.




Exposure even can help change a harmful social norm that
wrongfully made a person feel "different" in the first place. For
example, the "exposures" of certain celebrities as gay allegedly
empowered others to come out and ultimately change the harmful
social norm that made them feel ostracized.260 Even if the norm does
not change, the exposure could lead to other emotional benefits such
as a sense of community, relief, or forgiveness.261 Exposing people's
public actions and statements also brings certain issues, previously
hidden at the expense of a certain segment of society, into the public
sphere where they can be debated and addressed.262 For example,
some feminist scholars have argued that over-insistence on privacy
kept many women's rights issues hidden from public scrutiny. In all of
these ways, the increased pride, self-esteem, confidence and other
emotional benefits likely offset dignity harms to the one being exposed
or to people fearing exposure.263
5. DECEPTION PREVENTION BENEFITS
One reason some people vilify the Obscurity Problem is that they
have something to hide and depend upon others' ignorance regarding
this "something" in order to maintain their personal and professional
relationships.264 Revealing this information may "correct
misapprehensions that the individual is trying to exploit, as when a
260 See 8OLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 144 (discussing Zimmerman
and acknowledging that "more disclosures about people's private lives might change
hypocritical social norms that societies proclaim in public but flout in private").
261 See Posner, supra note 16, at 408 ("If ignorance is the prerequisite of trust, equally
knowledge, which privacy conceals, is the prerequisite of forgiveness.").
262 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 17, at 81-82.
263 See BAILEY, supra note 247, at 204 ("Interpersonal relationships will in fact be better if
there is less of a concern for privacy. After all, forthrightness, honesty and candor are, for
the most part, virtues, while hypocrisy and deceit are not.") (quoting Richard
Wasserstrom).
264 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 26o-61 (1981) (concluding that
"[p]eople conceal past criminal acts not out of bashfulness but precisely because potential
acquaintances quite sensibly regard a criminal past as negative evidence of the value of
cultivating an acquaintance with the person"). Expanding this thought to non-criminal
activities, people conceal past social behavior (e.g., a keg stand) not out of bashfulness but
precisely because potential acquaintances (e.g., employers or first dates) quite sensibly
regard a poor social choice in the past as negative evidence of the value of dating,
employing, or spending time with such a person.
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worker conceals a serious health problem from his employer or a
prospective husband conceals his sterility from his fianc&e."2 65 Thus,
exposing truthful facts about a person that he purposefully hides from
others acts as a "deception prevention" device, which many view as a
net benefit for society. 266
Preventing deception leads to other societal benefits, both directly
and indirectly, such as ensuring that one does not hire an
irresponsible person to take care of one's children.267 Knowing more
about someone also can help people make decisions based on real
information rather than relying on inaccurate stereotypes.268 If we
know more about people, and observe them benefitting society despite
their past behavior, perhaps we will learn to be more forgiving and
less judgmental.269 Legally barring or punishing the exposure of such
information lets the deception and poor decision making continue in
the interest of protecting a mythical right to obscurity.27o
265 POSNER, supra note 264, at 233.
266 Posner, supra note 16, at 400; BAILEY, supra note 247, at 184 ("[T]he more privacy we
have, the less likely we are able to trust someone. Knowing something about a person helps
you make a reasonable judgment about whether to trust him or her.") (discussing legal
philosophy of Michael Froomkin).
267 See FRED CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 29 (1997) ("What parent would not
want to know if her child's babysitter had been convicted for child abuse? Similarly, what
storeowner would not want to know whether his physician had a history of malpractice?
What man or woman would not want to know if a potential sexual partner had a sexually
transmitted disease? What airline would not want to know if its pilots were subject to
epileptic seizures? Yet the interest in not disclosing that information is precisely what
privacy protects.").
268 Strahilevitz, supra note 33, at 1684-88 (suggesting ways in which reputational
information can replace race as proxy and thus reduce discrimination based on race).
269 In this way, a digital dossier, which Daniel Solove invites us to fear, is a good thing, not
a bad thing. The dossier documents the positive as well as the negative. Perhaps as one
philosopher suggests, it even would be quite liberating to not have to live two lives, one
private, and one public. See Richard A. Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Arguments and
Assumptions, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, AN ANTHOLOGY 331 (Ferdinand
D. Schoeman, ed., 1984) ("[An] emphasis upon the maintenance of a private side to life
[leads to a] dualistic, unintegrated life that renders the individuals who live it needlessly
vulnerable, shame ridden, and lacking in a clear sense of self [versus] the more open, less
guarded life of the person who has so little to fear from disclosures of self ... ").
270 Richard Posner equates some emphasis on privacy as fraud. Posner, supra note 16, at
399 ("An analogy to the world of commerce may help to explain why people should not-on
economic grounds, in any event-have a right to conceal material facts about themselves.
We think it wrong (and inefficient) that the law should permit a seller in hawking his wares
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C. MOVING TOWARDS THE PROPER BALANCE
The purpose of Parts III.A and III.B was to begin aggregating the
collective harms of the Obscurity Problem versus the collective
benefits of exposing public conduct, pursuant to the balance described
in Part II.B. In Part III.A, I showed that scholars appear to oppose the
full democratization of exposure because they believe that it harms the
emotional and intellectual interests of those exposed and of society as
a whole. I then showed how these harms likely have been overstated
due to the reliance on multiple assumptions that have gone
unquestioned. For example, I showed how exposure harms often are
fleeting, rather than permanent; how the potential for exposure has
caused some people to think and speak more, not less; that the
Supreme Court in Doe balanced interests and came down in favor of
exposure; and how political activity has survived and flourished even
when faced with exposure via sunshine laws.
Although further aggregation and discussion of benefits should be
done before drawing ultimate conclusions, a preliminary balance is
worth conducting. A good starting point for the balancing is to
compare apples to apples-to compare emotional harms to emotional
benefits. Parts III.A and III.B show that for every exposed or
potentially exposed person emotionally harmed or threatened by an
exposure, there is at least one person emotionally benefitted via the
same exposure, whether it is the person doing the exposing, the
person exposed, or the person receiving the exposed information.
Assuming for balancing purposes that the number of people
emotionally harmed or benefitted, and the degree to which they are so
harmed or benefitted, is relatively equal, these harms and benefits
likely balance each other out.2 71
The only harm then left on the side of changing the "no privacy in
public" rule is the harm associated with intrusion into one's thinking
space.2 72 Although it is difficult to quantify this harm, assigning it a
precise value is not necessary. One also need not agree with me that
this harm has been overstated due to certain faulty assumptions.273
to make false or incomplete representations as to their quality. But people *sell' themselves
as well as their goods.").
271 Admittedly, this cannot be assessed as a perfect balance without a more detailed inquiry
that assigns some value to each side in particular situations. Other interests not specifically
mentioned such as those based on the First Amendment, also must be considered.
272 See supra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 173-94 and accompanying text.
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Rather, one need only balance the thinking space value-whatever it
may be-against the value of the many non-emotional benefits I
described in Part III.B. 274 For example, I showed how exposures
consistent with the "no privacy in public" rule lead to more
accountability for our government officials, increased enforcement of
beneficial social norms that save lives, the tearing down of social
norms that wrongfully oppress certain groups, more deterrence of
criminal activity, increased ease of reporting criminal activity, more
reliable eyewitness testimony, more accurate information about the
people with whom we spend our valuable time and money, and the
enjoyment of having one's voice heard by millions of others.
Although it likely is too early to make a definitive, pragmatic
decision regarding the "no privacy in public" rule, these many benefits
at least should make legal commentators pause before calling for its
demise. Additional time and effort also should be directed toward
examining the assumptions detailed in Part III.A to see if these alleged
harms have a firm basis in reality. Only after taking those two steps-
and doing so more evenhandedly-should anyone seriously consider
changing the "no privacy in public" rule.
D. SPECIAL CASES
Although a pragmatic balance may favor retention of the "no
privacy in public" rule in many instances, the balance may tip the
other way in a small set of special cases distinguishable because they
involve the exposure of a body part or bodily activity that society
generally regards as "private" even when the person ventures into
"public." This special category includes exposures such as publishing a
photograph of a woman's bare bottom taken in a shopping center
when a gust of air blows up her skirt,275 publishing a photograph of a
teenager's genitals taken during an athletic event,276 or publishing a
photograph of someone going to the bathroom taken through the gap
in a restaurant bathroom stall.27 Under a strict application of the "no
274 See supra notes 215-67 and accompanying text.
275 Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
276 McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 9ol, 905 (Tex. App. 1991).
277Autopsy photos, which often involve grisly bodily exposures, also likely would fall into
this category. For a thorough discussion of why such photos deserve special privacy
protection, see JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT (2008). Prosser also acknowledged
that "a difference may at least be found between a harmless report of a private wedding
and the morbid publication of the picture of a deformed child." Richards & Solove, supra
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privacy in public" rule that I defend above, these exposures would
appear acceptable because the information collected and re-published
initially was shared in a public place (i.e., a shopping mall, a soccer
stadium or a restaurant).
A more careful inquiry, however, suggests that these bodily
exposures instead deserve special treatment under the pragmatic
balancing test given the comparatively greater harms and
comparatively fewer benefits they trigger.278 On the harm side,
exposures of one's body parts or bodily functions often have been
considered particularly harmful to personal dignity, and thus worthy
of special legal protection in other contexts.2 7 9 On the benefits side,
the possible benefits flowing from such exposures are minimal
because exposing someone's body parts or bodily functions generally
does not improve governmental or personal accountability, deter
crime, or prevent deception.280 As Richard Posner has stated, "because
the individual's desire to suppress the photograph [of a body part] is
not related to misrepresentation in any business or social market
place, there is no basis for a presumption that the social value of
disclosure exceeds that of concealment."28 1
Consider the example of Robert, whose sexual preferences and
behaviors were described by his one-time lover in her blog.282
Although having one's sexual preferences exposed to others is far from
note 17, at 1O (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (lst ed.
1941)).
278 See also Lance Rothenberg, Comment, Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and Failure of
the Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space,
49 AM. U.L. REV. 1127 (2000) (calling upon the criminal law to penalize voyeurs who
surreptitiously record the private body parts of persons in public).
279 California and Louisiana already have adopted "video voyeur" statutes recognizing a
privacy-based protection against recorded intrusions "under or through the clothing" of a
person even if that person is in public. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(2) (West 2011); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 14:283(A)(1) (2011); see Rothenberg, supra note 278 (discussing California
and Louisiana statutes and the real-life privacy violations that motivated them).
280 Rather, the little information provided by exposing the "offensive or embarrassing
characteristics of [an] individual" provides little to no discreditable information, and, thus,
does not "serve the prevention-deception goal." Posner, supra note 16, at 413; see id. at
400 ("Some private information that people desire to conceal is not discreditable. In our
culture, for example, most people do not like to be seen naked, quite apart from any
discreditable fact that such observation might reveal.").
281 Id. at 414.
282 Supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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ideal for most people, the pragmatic balance would shift significantly
in Robert's favor should Ms. Cutler have sought to describe or publish
a photograph of Robert's genitals. The latter exposure likely would fall
into the special cases category described here because the benefits to
society of sharing the information would be exceptionally low
(knowing precisely what Robert's genitals look like does not help one
judge whether he is a good or bad person), while the harms to Robert's
dignity would be exceptionally high (knowing that anyone, anywhere
can pull up a picture of one's genitals could be particularly harmful to
one's dignity and other emotional interests).283 A similar approach
could be used to justify restrictions on publishing the name of a rape
victim or on publishing autopsy photos because such exposures
"cause[] distress to the victim's family while providing no information
useful to people contemplating transactions with her (since she was
dead) or with her family."284 Ultimately, these body-focused exposures
likely are less worthy of protection because they provide no useful
reputational information regarding the individual exposed, and
therefore are distinguishable from all other types of exposures of
information shared in public.
V. CONCLUSION
The rhetoric regarding technology's assault on privacy has peaked
at predictable points in time, most often when appreciation of a
certain technology's beneficial uses has not yet caught up to the fears
regarding its negative uses.285 One common tactic is to describe
technology as a new, more harmful type of privacy invasion, thus
283 Posner, supra note 16, at 414. Similarly, consider the exposure of Dog Poop Girl's
behavior-her refusal to clean up her dog's excrement on a subway train-versus an
exposure involving Dog Poop Girl's own body parts or bodily functions. Publishing a
photograph of Dog Poop Girl's bare bottom taken while she was going to the bathroom is
inherently different than publishing the photograph of her refusing to clean up her dog's
excrement; the former "could convey no information enabling her friends and
acquaintances to correct misapprehensions about her character which she might have
engendered" while the latter would help friends and acquaintances to decide whether she
was a good, respectful person or not. Id.
284 Id. at 416.
285 Fears about online privacy are particularly amusing to some critics who work in the
technology business. See, e.g., BAILEY, supra note 247, at 137 ("You can go and find a
mailbox right now, open the door to a tin box, tin door, no lock, with unencrypted
information in English, sealed in a paper-thin envelope with spit, yet people are worried
about online privacy.") (quoting Scott McNealy of Sun Microsystems).
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inspiring fear. "We shall soon be nothing but transparent heaps of
jelly to each other," warned an interviewer of the inventor of a wireless
signaling device capable of penetrating walls.286 "[T]he latest advances
in photographic art have rendered it possible to take pictures
surreptitiously," gasped Warren and Brandeis.287 Fear of these
supposed harms then is used to justify some type of new legal
restriction or remedy.288 At present, the fear is inspired by stories of
lives permanently and irreversibly scarred by public information being
shared with millions and associated warnings that "you, too, could be
Dog Poop Girl, and have your life ruined" due to a short lapse in
judgment.289 The new legal restriction or remedy demanded is a
supposedly necessary change to the "no privacy in public" rule in
order to protect people's obscurity.
Critics of the "no privacy in public" rule suggest that its time has
passed and that one now needs some amount of privacy in public-in
other words, a right to obscurity-in order to function in society.
However, as the initial harms versus benefits balance detailed above
shows, the "no privacy in public" rule likely remains valid, useful, and
beneficial to society, even one as technologically-advanced as our own,
in all but a very few special cases. This is because the current and
future lack of a right to obscurity leads to many positive societal
benefits, including accountability for our public officials and
286 Science, The Academy, Vol. 50, p. 569, Dec. 19, 1896-No. 1285 (cited by Virginia Postrel,
No Telling, REASON, June 1998).
287 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at 211. "Instantaneous photographs ... have
invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops."' Id. at 195; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 36, at
196 ("[M]odern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy,
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere
bodily injury."). Even the concept of the white pages in the phone book once triggered
irrational privacy fears. BAILEY, supra note 247, at 172-73.
288 As Coleridge famously stated, "In politics, what begins in fear usually ends in folly."
SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, SPECIMEN OF THE TABLE TALK OF THE LATE SAMUEL TAYLOR
COLERIDGE 111 (1836).
289 See, e.g., SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 48 ("Whether you like it or
not, whether you intend it or not, the Internet can make you an instant celebrity. You could
be the next Star Wars Kid."); SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 2
("Like the dog poop girl, you could find photos and information about yourself spread
around the Internet like a virus."); Solove, supra note 1, at 969 ("Without warning, anyone
can broadcast another's unguarded moments or times of youthful awkwardness to an
audience of millions.").
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ourselves, better crime prevention and reporting, and more
information about the people with whom we engage in important
personal and business transactions. Ultimately, the balance is likely to
show that a potential loss in obscurity is a small price to pay for these
benefits, and that the "no privacy in public" rule generally remains
valid. At the very least, before we decide to restrict the flow of truthful,
public information in the interest of protecting Dog Poop Girl's
mythical right to obscurity, we need to better understand what it is we
are sacrificing by doing so.
